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Central Banks and Climate Change
Christina Parajon Skinner *
Central banks are increasingly called upon to address climate change.
Proposals for central bank action on climate change range from programs of
“green” quantitative easing to increases in risk-based capital requirements
meant to deter banks from lending to climate-unfriendly business. Politicians
and academics alike have urged climate risk as both macroeconomic and
financial stability risk. Relative to counterparts abroad, the U.S. central bank—
the Federal Reserve—has been more measured in its response.
This Article offers a legal explanation why. It urges that, despite the
substantive importance of climate change, the U.S. Federal Reserve presently
has relatively limited legal authority to address that problem head-on. Drawing
on insights from corporate finance and macroeconomics, the Article constructs
a legal framework—stitching together a variety of Fed laws, regulations, and
precedents of practice—to discern why many aspects of climate change sit
outside the Fed’s legal remit today.
Ultimately, the Article tackles one of the most pressing rule-of-law
questions facing the Fed today: What are the limits of the Fed’s mandates to
address climate change and how far can the Fed press beyond those mandates
to make the economy greener? In doing so, the Article prompts reflection on the
ideal role of the Fed vis-à-vis the fiscal authority of the Treasury, the political
actors in Congress, and the Chief Executive.

*
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change is widely perceived as one of the most pressing
social and economic issues of the day. The potential macroeconomic
impact of climate change has been drawn in particularly sharp relief.
As the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco stated,
climate events “can destroy wealth, exacerbate existing income
inequalities, and . . . displace people permanently.” 1 Still, not every
economic problem falls within the purview of the central bank. This
1.
Mary C. Daly, President & CEO, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F., Speech at the Economics of
Climate Change Conference: Why Climate Change Matters to Us 4 (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://www.frbsf.org/our-district/press/presidents-speeches/mary-c-daly/2019/november/whyclimate-change-matters-to-us/ [https://perma.cc/N8EW-WUVA].
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Article critically examines whether, and in what respects, the Federal
Reserve (“Fed”) has the legal authority to address climate change.
To be sure, climate change is predicted to cause significant
economic upheaval. 2 Some of the anticipated economic harms derive
from the physical manifestations of climate change, such as heat waves,
hurricanes, severe precipitation events, storm surges, and wildfires. 3
While these kinds of physical risks result from short-term emergencies
with a clear end point, in other cases the physical effects of climate
change may progress gradually, as in the case of sea-level rise and ocean
acidification. 4
So-called transition risk, meanwhile, refers to economic
disruption associated with regulatory and legal requirements that
businesses reduce their use of fossil fuels. 5 The concern is that these

2.
See NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FIN. SYS., A CALL FOR ACTION: CLIMATE CHANGE AS A
SOURCE
OF
FINANCIAL
RISK
13–17
(Apr.
2019),
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_first_comprehensive_report__17042019_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9S7-PAG8] [hereinafter NGFS REPORT]; Emanuele
Campiglio, Yannis Dafermos, Pierre Monnin, Josh Ryan-Collins, Guido Schotten & Misa Tanaka,
Climate Change Challenges for Central Banks and Financial Regulators, 8 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 462, 462 (2018).
3.
These extreme weather events are increasing in both frequency and intensity. Iman
Mallakpour & Gabriele Villarini, The Changing Nature of Flooding Across the Central United
States, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 250, 250–54 (2015) (noting the increasing nature of flooding
events in the United States); Andreas F. Prein, Changhai Liu, Kyoko Ikeda, Stanley B. Trier, Roy
M. Rasmussen, Greg J. Holland & Martyn P. Clark, Increased Rainfall Volume from Future
Convective Storms in the US, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 880, 880–84 (2017) (discussing
increasing precipitation in storms in the United States); Katie K. Arkema, Greg Guannel, Gregory
Verutes, Spencer A. Wood, Anne Guerry, Mary Ruckelshaus, Peter Kareiva, Martin Lacayo &
Jessica M. Silver, Coastal Habitats Shield People and Property from Sea-Level Rise and Storms, 3
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 913, 913 (2013) (discussing projected increase in coastal flooding by
2100); Thomas R. Knutson, John L. McBride, Johnny Chan, Kerry Emanuel, Greg Holland, Chris
Landsea, Isaac Held, James P. Kossin, A. K. Srivastava & Masato Sugi, Tropical Cyclones and
Climate Change, 3 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 157, 160–61 (2010) (examining projected increases in
hurricane intensity); Seung-Ki Min, Xuebin Zhang, Francis W. Zxiers & Gabriele C. Hegerl,
Human Contribution to More-Intense Precipitation Extremes, 470 NATURE 378, 378–80 (2011)
(examining how rainfall events are becoming increasingly intense).
4.
Lael Brainard, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the
Economics of Climate Change Conference: Why Climate Change Matters for Monetary Policy and
Financial
Stability
(Nov.
8,
2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/brainard20191108a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4VET-C3XS]; see also Sophie Quinton, As Wildfire Risk Increases, Home
Insurance Is Harder to Find, PEW (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2019/01/03/as-wildfire-risk-increases-home-insurance-is-harder-to-find
[https://perma.cc/NF6L-GLMV].
5.
Brainard, supra note 4; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
SPECIAL
REPORT:
GLOBAL
WARMING
OF
1.5OC
323
(2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_Low_Res.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6572-TSDN] [hereinafter IPCC REPORT 2018] (noting that disruptive innovation
can lead to assets, such as fossil fuels, being “stranded” and “unburnable”); NGFS REPORT, supra
note 2, at 15; Campiglio et al., supra note 2, at 462.
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kinds of future policy changes 6 will reduce the value of assets associated
with carbon-intensive sectors, such as oil, gas, and coal. Accordingly,
should these transition policies come to pass, financial firms holding
such assets (i.e., loans) on their balance sheets stand to suffer losses. 7
Transition risks also imply new costs to businesses from
adapting to a greener regime. The implementation of the Paris Climate
Agreement illustrates that aspect of transition risk. The nations who
are party to that Agreement have committed to “pursuing efforts” to
limit temperature increases to below two degrees Celsius above
preindustrial levels; and they aspire to a below-1.5 degrees goal. 8 If
policymakers were to pursue that more aggressive aim, they would have
to enact legislation and regulation reducing global greenhouse gas
emissions to net zero by around 2050. 9 The magnitude of rules required
to effect such substantial change would impact businesses across many
sectors of the economy, such as transportation, energy production, and
building and construction. Therefore, in regard to both physical and
transition risk, there is considerable economic uncertainty. 10
Politicians and the public have called on central banks to flex
their tools and tackle climate change. 11 In the United States, some

6.
See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement,
art. 4, U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015); IPCC REPORT 2018, supra note 5, at 4–8.
7.
Campiglio et al, supra note 2, at 462; see also Kyle Younker, ESG Advent Leaves Coal
(Jan.
10,
2020),
Assets—and
Investors—Stranded,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/debtwire/2020/01/10/esg-advent-leaves-coal-assets—and-investors—
stranded/#a07915a73764 [https://perma.cc/PXW3-9UV8]. Transition risk is not only implied from
the actual adoption of new policies but also, possibly, from the expectation that policies will be
adopted and resulting pressure from investors. See, e.g., Taylor Kuykendall, Ashleigh Cotting &
Declan Harty, Investment Giant BlackRock Marks a Major Milestone in Coal Divestment
GLOB.
MKT.
INTEL.
(Jan.
22,
2020),
Movement,
S&P
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/investment-giant-blackrock-marks-a-major-milestone-in-coal-divestment-movement56669181 [https://perma.cc/BUZ8-GD22].
8.
IPCC REPORT 2018, supra note 5, at 12. There are multiple potential pathways to achieve
this net zero goal. See id. at 12–15. Reports have suggested that the 1.5-degree goal is essential to
avoid the worst impacts of climate change. Id. at 4.
9.
Id. at 12.
10. See infra notes 97, 108 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Letter from Ceres to the Hon. Jerome H. Powell, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of
the
Fed.
Rsrv.
Sys.
(July
21,
2020),
https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/Federal%20Regulators%20Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MF8V-F2F8]; Simon Dikau & Ulrich Volz, Central Bank Mandates,
Sustainability Objectives and the Promotion of Green Finance (SOAS Dep’t of Econ., Univ. of
London,
Working
Paper
No.
232,
2020),
https://www.soas.ac.uk/economics/research/workingpapers/file145514.pdf [https://perma.cc/K39Y4BU4]; Patrick Honohan, Should Monetary Policy Take Inequality and Climate Change Into
Account? (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 19-18, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3478285
[https://perma.cc/NB4H-JR2D];
Paul Langley & John H. Morris, Central Banks: Climate Governors of Last Resort?, 52 ECON. &
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Senators have asked the Fed to “prepare its supervised institutions for
the risks associated with climate change.” 12 Treasury Secretary Janet
Yellen has called for a “sprinting start” to addressing climate change
which nods at a “whole of government” approach. 13 Within the
European Union (“EU”), the President of the European Central Bank
(“ECB”), Christine Lagarde, has similarly been urged by her
constituents to “act now on climate change” and “[w]ithout any further
delay.” 14 Governor of the Banque de France François Villeroy de Galhau
appeared to endorse such sentiment in his September 2019 warning
that global climate change could cause “stagflationnary shock.” 15
Several central bank leaders have responded favorably to this
call to arms. Ms. Lagarde, at the forefront, confirmed that climate
change is indeed “mission critical” for the ECB. 16 Former Bank of
England Governor Mark Carney was also front and center in the
climate change debate. Under the leadership of Mr. Carney’s successor,
Andrew J. Bailey, the Bank adopted the position that physical and
transition risks “are relevant to [the Bank’s] mission to maintain
monetary and financial stability.” 17 With similar spirit, the President
SPACE 1471 (2020); Graham Steele, Confronting the ‘Climate Lehman Moment’: The Case for
Macroprudential Climate Regulation, 30 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109 (2020).
12. Letter from the Hon. Jerome H. Powell, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv.
Sys.,
to
the
Hon.
Brian
Schatz,
Sen.,
U.S.
Senate
(Apr.
18,
2019),
https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chair%20Powell%20to%20Sen.%20Schatz%204.18.
19.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AHT-4JHJ].
13. Janet L. Yellen, Sec’y of the Treasury, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at the Leaders
Summit on Climate (Apr. 22, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0143
[https://perma.cc/M78N-99DW]; see also Fin. Stability Oversight Council, U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury,
First
Principal
Meeting
(Mar.
31,
2021),
https://treas.yorkcast.com/webcast/Play/a37bd8443e1a48589a66f08f3ab6b68c1d
[https://perma.cc/G78L-N78M]; ENV’T DEF. FUND, RECAPTURING U.S. LEADERSHIP ON CLIMATE
(Mar.
2021),
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/Recapturing%20U.S.%20Leadership%20on%20
Climate.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5A4-BMGC] (calling for a “whole-of-government effort”).
14. Open Letter to Christine Lagarde, President, Eur. Cent. Bank (Nov. 27, 2019),
http://www.positivemoney.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Open-Letter-to-Christine-Lagarde-onclimate-change.pdf [https://perma.cc/G78L-N78M].
15. François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor, Banque de France, Keynote Address at the World
Conference of Banking Institutes: The Role of Banking in a Sustainable Global Economy 6 (Sept.
17,
2019),
https://www.banquefrance.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/2019.09.17_wcbi_v7_cl.pdf [https://perma.cc/89EKZKLB]; see also François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor, Banque de France, Speech at the Banque
de France: The Role of Central Banks in the Greening of the Economy (Feb. 11, 2021),
https://www.bis.org/review/r210211g.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLJ2-WFYE].
16. Liz Alderman, Lagarde Vows to Put Climate Change on the E.C.B.’s Agenda, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
4,
2019)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/business/climate-change-ecb-lagarde.html
[https://perma.cc/P9XA-RKN8].
17. Climate Change, BANK OF ENG., https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/climate-change
[https://perma.cc/YX3A-E8F7] (last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
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of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has indicated that
studying climate risk is “essential” to its mission of economic and
financial stability. 18
These central bankers are now taking action collectively at the
global level. 19 A group of eight central banks, including the Bank of
England and Banque de France, formed the Network for Greening the
Financial System (“NGFS”) in December 2017 as a voluntary
organization devoted to examining what central banks can do to
address climate change. 20 Membership has since grown to sixty-nine
members and thirteen observers. 21 In April 2019, the NGFS issued its
first report, setting out physical and transition risks to financial
stability, and offered six recommendations to be implemented to
improve financial stability. 22
This desire to tackle climate change with central banking tools
has been taken forward with a number of policy ideas and actions.
Perhaps most aggressively, some central banks have deployed
monetary policy tools—including their balance sheets—in an effort to
18. Daly, supra note 1, at 1. Jens Weidmann, Chair of the Board of Directors for the Bank of
International Settlements, has also indicated that central banks “are being called upon to assume
an active role in climate policy.” Jens Weidmann, Chair, Bd. of Dirs. of the Bank for Int’l
Settlements, Remarks at the ILF Online-Conference, Green Banking and Green Central Banking:
What Role Should Central Banks Play in Combating Climate Change? (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://www.bis.org/review/r210128a.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX79-DYDL].
19. See, e.g., NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FIN. SYS., https://www.ngfs.net/en/aboutus/membership (last visited July 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8NZ3-AQJG]; About, FIN. STABILITY
BD. TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/about/ (last
visited July 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7BMQ-4DBC]; Press Release, Fin. Stability. Bd., FSB
Stocktake Considers Climate Risks and Financial Stability (July 22, 2020),
https://www.fsb.org/2020/07/fsb-stocktake-considers-climate-risks-and-financial-stability/
[https://perma.cc/74D3-8Q89].
FOR
GREENING
THE
FIN.
SYS.,
20. Origin
and
Purpose,
NETWORK
https://www.ngfs.net/en/about-us/governance/origin-and-purpose (last visited Sept. 14, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/8NZ3-AQJG].
21. Membership, NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FIN. SYS., https://www.ngfs.net/en/aboutus/membership (last visited Sept. 14, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8W5D-DU56].
22. NGFS REPORT, supra note 2. In June 2020, the NGFS issued additional reports and
technical documents regarding climate change and monetary policy, scenario planning, and other
subjects. NGFS Climate Scenarios for Central Banks and Supervisors, NETWORK FOR GREENING
FIN.
SYS.
(June
2020),
THE
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_climate_scenarios_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72KX-PKML]; NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FIN. SYS., GUIDE TO CLIMATE
SCENARIO
ANALYSIS
FOR
CENTRAL
BANKS
AND
SUPERVISORS
(June
2020),
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_guide_scenario_analysis_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QH8-W3VQ]; NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FIN. SYS., CLIMATE CHANGE AND
MONETARY POLICY: INITIAL TAKEAWAYS (June 2020) [hereinafter NGFS INITIAL TAKEAWAYS],
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/climate_change_and_monetary_policy.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2K2G-29YR]; NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FIN. SYS., THE MACROECONOMIC
AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: RESEARCH PRIORITIES (June 2020),
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_research_priorities_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9K7K-2GBF].
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achieve a greener world. As one example, the Swedish central bank
offloaded from its balance sheet certain government bonds from the
regions of Alberta, Canada, and Queensland, Australia due to high
emissions in those areas. 23 Other versions of what is now called “green
quantitative easing” have emerged: these policies encourage the central
bank purchasing corporate bonds that have been designated “green.” 24
Relatedly, some central banks are considering whether to add green
criteria in the determination of which types of collateral are eligible in
exchange for central bank loans. 25
Others have suggested that regulation be used to provide
incentives for banks to make their investments greener. Capital
requirements have been a particular area of focus. Banks in the United
States, and globally, are subject to a complex set of regulatory
requirements regarding the minimum level of equity capital that must
comprise their capital (i.e., funding) structure. Tweaking the capital
charge associated with each of the bank’s assets could in theory provide
incentives for greener investments or, on the flip side, disincentives for
investment in climate-unfriendly assets. 26 Other regulatory proposals
include setting higher margin requirements on securities or derivatives
with climate or carbon exposure and directly capping the allowable
amount of climate-change-related assets in a bank’s portfolio. 27
Finally, central bankers and central bank experts have put
forward creative ideas about supervising banks for excessive climate
risk-taking. As part of their job to ensure commercial banks are running
safely, central banks routinely examine and assess these institutions
along a number of dimensions. Incorporating climate change into a
central bank’s supervisory role might involve, for example, an
assessment of the bank’s risk management function as regards its
23. The Editorial Board, Opinion, Bankers Aren’t Climate Scientists, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankers-arent-climate-scientists-11573861841
[https://perma.cc/953Z-BMH2].
24. See, e.g., Campiglio et al., supra note 2; Benoît Cœuré, Member, Exec. Bd., Eur. Cent.
Bank, Speech at Conference on Scaling Up Green Finance: Monetary Policy and Climate Change
(Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.bis.org/review/r181109f.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NB6-XWSE].
25. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 24.
26. See GRAHAM STEELE, GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE, A REGULATORY GREEN LIGHT: HOW
DODD-FRANK CAN ADDRESS WALL STREET’S ROLE IN THE CLIMATE CRISIS (Jan. 2020),
https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Final_Greenlight_Steele.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HD5N-FEZV]; Conny Olovsson, Is Climate Change Relevant For Central Banks?,
SVERIGES RIKSBANK, ECON. COMMENTS., no. 13 (2018).
27. STEELE, supra note 26, at 18–19. For recent initiatives in this regard in the EU, see, for
example, Commission Delegated Regulation 2021/59 of 14 Dec. 2020, art. 1, 2020 O.J. (L 127) 1
(EU) (appearing to give credit institutions and investment firms latitude to apply higher capital
charges for certain “specialised lending exposure” which include those that include the “financ[ing]
[of] the development or acquisition of . . . power plants, chemical processing plants, mines,
transportation infrastructure, environment . . . .”).
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climate exposures; the efficacy of its environmental-social-governance
(“ESG”) policies; and a view to whether a bank is adequately modeling
scenarios where climate-related risks affect its balance sheet. 28
The Fed has been relatively more measured in its response. In
2019 testimony to Congress, Fed Chair Jerome Powell stated that while
“climate change is an important issue,” it is “not principally for the
Fed.” 29 To date, the Fed has committed to researching the risks that
climate change might pose in ways relevant to the Fed, and has joined
the NGFS, but has not yet agreed to more. 30 But against this rising tide
of central bank activity, the Fed has been criticized for holding back on
climate change by its foreign counterparts and academics alike. 31 These
commentators have suggested that the Fed is hamstrung by a
pernicious political environment and beholden to carbon-hungry Wall
Street. 32 Yet it remains substantially unclear whether climate change
is a policy problem that Congress has given the U.S. central bank the
power to address.
This Article is the first to undertake a comprehensive and
careful study of the Fed’s legal authority to address climate change.
Specifically, the Article addresses three questions critical to the debate
surrounding central banks and climate change:

28. See, e.g., Damian Carrington, Firms Ignoring the Climate Crisis Will Go Bankrupt, Says
Mark
Carney,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
13,
2019,
7:00),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/13/firms-ignoring-climate-crisis-bankruptmark-carney-bank-england-governor [https://perma.cc/67KN-6H7T]; Brainard, supra note 4;
STEELE, supra note 26; NGFS REPORT, supra note 2.
29. The Editorial Board, supra note 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. The Fed joined the NGFS in December 2020 and established a new climate committee in
January 2021. See Avery Ellfeldt, ‘Enormously Big Deal’: Fed Creates Climate Committee, E&E
NEWS
(Jan.
26,
2021),
https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/1063723523
[https://perma.cc/AK4A-PC9T]; Avery Ellfeldt, Lawmakers Grill Fed Chair on Climate Change
Risk, E&E NEWS (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1062326955
[https://perma.cc/U4BZ-Q2B2]; NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FIN. SYS., supra note 21.
31. Gregg Gelzinis & Graham Steele, Climate Change Threatens the Stability of the Financial
FOR
A M.
PROGRESS
(Nov.
21,
2019,
12:01
AM),
System,
CTR.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/11/21/477190/climate-changethreatens-stability-financial-system/ [https://perma.cc/MH5C-C22P]; Adam Tooze, Why Central
Banks Need to Step Up on Global Warming, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 20, 2019),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/20/why-central-banks-need-to-step-up-on-global-warming/
[https://perma.cc/DB9G-ANVT]; Robinson Meyer, How Climate Change Could Trigger the Next
(Aug.
1,
2019),
Global
Financial
Crisis,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/08/how-fed-could-fight-climate-change-adamtooze/595084/ [https://perma.cc/7PP3-H25S].
32. Kate Aronoff, The Federal Reserve Is Accelerating the Climate Crisis, NEW REPUBLIC (May
1,
2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/157555/federal-reserve-accelerating-climate-crisis
[https://perma.cc/W672-5KEP] (noting that the Fed has “indulg[ed] the fossil fuel industry with
handouts” and arguing that, by doing so, “the Fed isn’t stabilizing a warming world . . . [i]t’s
heating it”).
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First, does climate change create risks that enter the Fed’s policy
domain?
• Second, to the extent that it does, does the law authorize the Fed
to address climate change through its powers in regard to
monetary policy; to regulate and supervise banks; or to research
and convene?
• Third, what are the normative implications of climate-change
intervention for the Fed’s relative power in the U.S. legal
system, its legitimacy, and its credibility as the mainstay of
economic and financial stability?
To answer these questions, the Article proceeds in three parts.
Part I provides the foundation for conceptualizing how climate change
might enter a central bank’s agenda. The Fed is not empowered to
address all matters of economic or social problems. The first question
should be whether climate change can present the kind of problem that
would trigger a lawful central bank response.
Accordingly, Part I analyzes whether climate change can
present firm-level or financial stability risks. It first considers how
climate change could create shocks that would in turn disrupt the
financial system’s ability to provide critical services (like payments).
Then, Part I considers how physical or transition risks might impact
the balance sheets of financial institutions within the Fed’s supervisory
and regulatory jurisdiction. It critically examines claims that climate
change events could create a situation of “contagion”—thereby
prompting instability. Part I then considers climate as a macroeconomic
risk. In that analysis, Part I discusses how classic macroeconomic
indicators, like inflation, gross domestic product (“GDP”), and
employment could be affected by climate change. 33
Part II translates climate-related policy problems articulated in
Part I into legal questions. It evaluates the spectrum of the Fed’s formal
legal authority along which it could possibly address climate risk.
•

33. Throughout, Part I considers whether these kinds of financial stability and economic risks
are possible as a result of climate change, including from severe weather events, gradual physical
climate changes like sea-level rise, or the more uncertain and longer-term economic risks arising
from the transition to a low-carbon economy. It also tracks the now consensus framework, set out
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, regarding the risk categories into which climate
falls (credit and related market and liquidity risk, arising from physical and transition risks). See
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CLIMATE-RELATED RISK DRIVERS AND THEIR
TRANSMISSION
CHANNELS
10
(Apr.
2021),
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d517.htm
[https://perma.cc/WZ7H-P2AU]:
[T]here is broad agreement that while climate risks have distinctive elements, they can
be reflected through the traditional financial risk categories . . . . Based on a review of
a broad set of examples of how climate risk drivers can impact banks, this report has
not found any evidence that would suggest an additional risk category needs to be
developed to address banks’ climate risks.
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Specifically, Part II considers the Fed’s existing monetary policy tools,
its regulatory framework, and its supervisory system. It also considers
the role of the regional Reserve Banks in addressing climate risk using
their “lender of last resort” (“LOLR”) role, as well as from a research
and educational perspective.
Parts I and II conclude that the Fed has its strongest legal
footing in the firm-level supervision of asset quality and exposure and
of operational risks arising from physical risk. The Fed would also have
a solid legal basis for responding to an exogenous climate shock with its
LOLR authority. On the other hand, the Fed currently lacks legal
authority to engage its monetary policy tools in pursuit of “offensive”
programs like “green quantitative easing.” Nor would the use of
regulation or supervision to deter certain kinds of “brown lending” sit
well within the Fed’s existing legal framework. 34 Part III concludes
with some suggestions for how the Fed should take forward an initiative
on climate risk, which squares with Fed law and the rule of law more
broadly. 35 These prescriptions are made with an eye to preserving the
appropriate balance of power between the Fed, the Executive, and
Congress.
Overall, this Article provides a novel framework for discussing
the Fed’s role and responsibility toward climate change, informed by
law and principles of U.S. governance and administration. And
ultimately, it should prompt further thought by Congress as to whether
the Fed is presently the most suitable institutional actor to address the
risks of climate change—and, in turn, the implications that follow for
the private sector and other financial regulators. 36
I. WHEN IS CLIMATE CHANGE A POLICY PROBLEM FOR THE FED?
The U.S. Congress tasks the Federal Reserve, like all
government agencies, with addressing a specific and finite universe of
policy problems. The Fed has two main lines of duty. For one, the Fed
protects the broad economy against unstable prices and low
employment. 37 Additionally, the Fed is the safekeeper of the financial
34. Many fields of positive law—including prudential regulation in banking—already have
significant implications for firm behavior with respect to the environment and the climate. Sarah
E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2019).
35. NGFS INITIAL TAKEAWAYS, supra note 22 (the NGFS likewise recommends further
research on monetary policy, and recognizes significant risks if the Fed acts in the monetary arena
in light of substantial uncertainties).
36. See Sarah E. Light & Christina Parajon Skinner, Banks and Climate Governance, 122
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2021) (on file with author) (examining the role of banks in
channeling savings to finance a greener economy).
37. Federal Reserve Act § 2A, 12 U.S.C. § 225a.
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system. In this latter role, the Fed is responsible for the safety and
soundness of the large financial institutions it oversees. 38 It also,
relatedly, has a role monitoring and maintaining the stability of the
U.S. financial system as a whole. This Part considers whether climate
change presents risks that implicate any of these roles—first
considering the Fed’s job as regulator and supervisor of firms; then
examining the Fed’s role as a monetary policy authority.
A. Climate and the Financial System
While the bank holding companies (“BHCs”) that the Fed
oversees may take voluntary action to mitigate climate change, 39 the
Fed’s authority to address climate risks in these institutions depends
on a nexus between climate change and these firms’ resilience. 40
1. Climate Risk as Operational Risk
One way in which climate change could feasibly impact a firm’s
resilience is by disrupting its physical operations. Generally,
operational risks implicate banks’ physical infrastructure, assets, and
employee behavior. 41 Extreme weather events are a classic example of
operational risk: heavy damage to bank property, diminished operating
capacity, and associated reputational risk could all impact the value of
a shareholder’s investment in a bank. 42
Indeed, banks increasingly fold climate-related risks into their
operational risk analyses. As JPMorgan Chase disclosed in its 2019
Annual 10-K report, “[I]f a catastrophic event occurs in an area in which
a critical segment of JPMorgan Chase’s workforce, physical assets or
systems and other support infrastructure is concentrated[,]” “[its]
38. The Fed oversees Bank Holding Companies, Financial Holding Companies, and firms
designated systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”).
39. See Light & Skinner, supra note 36.
40. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., SUPERVISION AND REGULATION REPORT
17–18 (May 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/202005-supervision-andregulation-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4NE-WMF3] (discussing the Fed’s supervisory role at
both the firm and system-wide levels).
41. “[O]perational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, people and systems, or external events.” Joshua Rosenberg, Exec. Vice
President & Chief Risk Officer, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the 18th Annual OpRisk
North America 2016 Conference: Operational Risk Management at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2016/ros160315
[https://perma.cc/68DM-3XBY].
42. For that reason, the securities law requires a publicly listed bank to regularly disclose all
manner of possible operational risks and the steps taken to address them. To the extent climate is
sufficiently certain to pose such operational risk, one would expect banks to start disclosing it.
Light, supra note 34, at 165–72 (discussing climate disclosures under securities regulations).
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ability to respond effectively to a business interruption could be
hampered.” 43 In particular, JPMorgan Chase noted, “[S]hould
emergency or catastrophic events such as severe or abnormal weather
conditions become more chronic, the disruptive effects of those events
on JPMorgan Chase’s business and operations . . . could become more
significant and long-lasting.” 44
This is relevant for the central bank. 45 Banks provide critical
services to the economy—like processing payments and credit, and
settling transactions—which requires their physical systems to remain
functioning smoothly. 46 Aside from banks, other institutions, referred
to as financial market infrastructures (“FMIs”), support the financial
system’s plumbing in various ways. 47 Some FMIs provide payment
systems like banks, 48 while others act as “central counterparties,”
known as “CCPs” 49—firms that stand between two counterparties to a
trade. 50 Many of these FMIs, though not formally BHCs, have been
43. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 20 (Feb. 25, 2020).
44. Id.
45. The Fed has long required banks to comply with operational risk capital surcharges. See
infra note 46; see also Christina Parajon Skinner, Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559
(2016) (arguing that prior to 2010, operational risk was largely viewed by central banks as
problems of an idiosyncratic nature).
46. Principally, regulators address operational risk by requiring banks to hold an additional
capital charge reflecting an estimated loss from an operational event which requires banks to use
historical data and information about the bank’s business environment and control systems to
assess themselves a capital surcharge. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, OPERATIONAL
RISK—SUPERVISORY GUIDELINES FOR THE ADVANCED MEASUREMENT APPROACHES (2011),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs196.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q697-BXDS].
47. Id.
48. BANK OF ENG., SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES—ANNUAL REPORT
(Feb. 2019), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/annual-report/2019/supervisionof-financial-market-infrastructures-annual-report-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SP82-FKRR]
(noting that these systems “allow funds to be transferred between businesses and individuals and
they are used for many day-to-day transactions . . . such as withdrawing cash from a cash
machine, receiving salary payments or making online payments”).
49. Like CSDs, CCPs are essential to the smooth functioning of the securities trading
markets. In today’s financial markets, the trading of securities takes place either on exchanges or
in what is known as “over-the-counter” (“OTC”) markets. Morten Bech, Jenny Hancock, Tara Rice
& Amber Wadsworth, On the Future of Securities Settlement, BIS Q. REV. 67, 68 (2020).
50. Post-2008 crisis reforms made central clearing a requirement for OTC transactions.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723, 124
Stat. 1376, 1675 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3); see also Paolo Saguato, The
Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the Game” is Not Enough, the Remutualization of
Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REGUL. 601, 614–619, 630–632 (2017) (discussing the role of
clearinghouses in the financial markets and their unique capital structure). Concentrating risk in
the CCPs was a post-2008 crisis innovation, aimed toward stopping losses from spreading between
counterparties in cases of economic shock and consolidating useful trading information. See Claude
Lopez & Elham Saeidinezhad, Central Counterparties Help, but Do Not Assure Financial Stability
1
(Milken
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
80358,
2017),
https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/80358/1/MPRA_paper_80358.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSX7-P2JU] (noting that CCPs
promote financial stability by providing multilateral netting and centralized default

2021]

CENTRAL BANKS AND CLIMATE CHANGE

1313

determined to be so critical to economic life that the Fed has been made
responsible for them as well. 51
Given these institutions’ importance to economic exchange and
risk management, the Fed has an interest in all manner of operational
risks they face—including “technology-based failures, cyber incidents,
pandemic outbreaks, and natural disasters.” 52 Just as the Fed has
begun to consider the operational risk associated with cyberattacks, it
would likewise have a strong financial-stability basis for considering
the ways in which severe climate events could similarly disrupt the
operational resilience of the banks and FMI firms that it oversees. 53
2. Climate Risk and the Balance Sheet
An impaired balance sheet can also impact a bank’s resilience
and, in turn, pose a financial stability risk. A growing body of literature

management); Paolo Saguato, The Unfinished Business of Regulating Clearinghouses, 2020
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 449, 496–513 (analyzing the current regulatory framework for
clearinghouses).
51. This determination is made by the FSOC. Designations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscalservice/fsoc/designations (last visited May 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E7CC-CD44]. Examples
include The Clearing House Payments Company, LLC; CLS Bank International; The Depository
Trust Company; and the ICE Clear Credit. Designated Financial Market Utilities, BD. OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated_fmu_about.htm (last updated Jan.
29, 2015) [https://perma.cc/R8HG-FBVM]. It is important to note that each of these FMUs has a
different regulator—such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”)—as its primary regulator; the Fed oversees these
institutions for financial stability reasons only. See Supervision & Oversight of Financial Market
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.,
Infrastructures,
BD.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/over_about.htm (last updated Sept. 2, 2009)
[https://perma.cc/8KDC-E89K].
52. Supervisory Policy and Guidance Topics, Information Technology Guidance, BD. OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/information-technology-guidance.htm (last
updated May 14, 2021) [https://perma.cc/B3XD-2865]; see also Building Operational Resilience:
Impact Tolerances for Important Business Services, BANK OF ENG. & FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Dec. 5,
2019),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/consultationpaper/2019/building-operational-resilience-impact-tolerances-for-important-business-services.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LCU6-TVNM] (discussing regulatory frameworks that promote operational
resilience in financial markets).
53. Much work has been done in addressing cyber risk in the past three years. See, e.g.,
COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. OF
SECS. COMM’NS, GUIDANCE ON CYBER RESILIENCE FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES
(June 2016), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d146.pdf [https://perma.cc/SKQ8-J6MR] (addressing
cyberattack detection, response, and recovery); THOMAS M. EISENBACH, ANNA KOVNER & MICHAEL
JUNHO LEE, CYBER RISK AND THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A PRE-MORTEM ANALYSIS (2020),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr909.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MNC-NF86] (discussing risks). Relatively less has been done about climate.
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discusses climate risk in this respect. 54 Corporate and household
borrowers who are unable to repay their loans due to climate change
can cause banks to suffer losses on those credit assets. 55 On a large
enough scale, the manifestation of such credit risk could, in theory,
become a financial stability problem. However, the Fed has
responsibility over a firm’s credit risk only insofar as it implicates an
issue of firm “safety and soundness” or the financial stability of the
system overall. 56
i. Climate Risk as Credit Risk
The Fed’s responsibility to ensure firms remain safe and sound
refers to its “microprudential” role. 57 Although safety and soundness
can have a number of specific meanings, 58 generally an accumulation of
credit risks that could threaten a bank’s solvency would be considered
unsafe, and a widescale decline in asset quality would be deemed an
unsound banking practice. 59 Presently, climate change does not appear
to present a safety and soundness issue for the largest U.S. banks.
An accounting and corporate finance analysis of bank balance
sheets illustrates why. First, one must consider how bank losses come
about. A bank’s credit assets (i.e., its investments) lose value only to the
extent they become “impaired” (an accounting, and in turn regulatory,

54. As Fed Board member Lael Brainard remarked at the end of 2019, although substantial
uncertainty remains, “we can begin to identify the factors that could propagate losses from natural
disasters, energy disruptions, and sudden shifts in the value of climate-exposed properties.”
Brainard, supra note 4, at 4–5.
55. Id.
56. There are a number of institutional actors that have an interest in heading off this
problem. Shareholders, for one, seek to protect the quality of their investment. A bank’s managers
and directors, who are accountable to those investors, will thus likely seek to act in ways that
protect their leadership positions within the firm (and their reputations). As far as regulators go,
the SEC, as the regulator of publicly listed companies, will want to protect the markets from abuse
or inefficiency by ensuring that banks disclose all “material” risks they face. These are items 303
and 305 of Regulation S-K, respectively. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.303, .305 (2021).
57. THOMAS EISENBACH, ANDREW HAUGHWOUT, BEVERLY HIRTLE, ANNA KOVNER, DAVID
LUCCA & MATTHEW PLOSSER, SUPERVISING LARGE, COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: WHAT DO
SUPERVISORS
DO?
4
(2015),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr729.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S96J-4T77].
58. See infra Part II.A.3.
59. See David Bholat, Rosa M. Lastra, Sheri M. Markose, Andrea Miglionico & Kallol Sen,
Non-performing Loans at the Dawn of IFRS 9: Regulatory and Accounting Treatment of Asset
Quality, 19 J. BANKING REGUL. 33 (2018) (discussing the relationship between asset quality and
sound banking). As the Basel Committee noted, “Climate risk drivers can impact household,
corporate, or sovereign income and/or wealth.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note
33, at 11. This Article focuses on credit risk to the extent it impacts corporate lending.
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term of art). Loans—which are a particular type of credit asset—are
impaired if and when they “nonperform” (a finance term of art). 60
Under the Fed’s required accounting treatment, impairment is
said to occur when a bank determines “it is probable that not all
principal and/or interest will be collected” from a borrower. 61 Banks can
exercise some judgment in making that determination. One common
method, also followed globally, is to consider a loan as nonperforming if
the borrower has made zero payments on principal or interest for
ninety days. 62
However, U.S. banks do not have to follow that practice. Instead,
banks in the Federal Reserve System are permitted to consider a
variety of factors in deciding whether a loan has become impaired.
These factors include:
(1) whether “the occurrence of significant changes in the borrower’s
financial position . . . indicate that the borrower may not be able
to repay the obligation, in whole or part,”
(2) whether the collateral will be sufficient to pay the loan,
(3) “historical experience with similar loans,” and
(4) “whether the Banks have exhausted all commercially reasonable
means of recovering the loan balance.” 63
In short, there are quite a number of ways that U.S. banks can save a
loan from devaluation from a balance sheet perspective.
If and only if the bank concludes that it is unlikely that a loan
will be repaid, in view of all those factors, will the asset be “impaired.” 64
The bank would then proceed to calculate the appropriate allowance for

60. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING MANUAL FOR
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS ¶ 81.03 (rev. Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/federalreserve-banks/fam/chapter-8-special-topics.htm#xsubsection-15-8327f811 [https://perma.cc/H763P5GY] (discussing methods for measuring loan impairment).
61. Id.
62. PATRIZIA BAUDINO, JACOPO ORLANDI & RAIHAN ZAMIL, FIN. STABILITY INST., THE
IDENTIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT OF NON-PERFORMING ASSETS: A CROSS-COUNTRY
COMPARISON 11 (Apr. 2018), https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights7.pdf [https://perma.cc/YRV3LLVU];
What
Is
a
Non-Performing
Loan
(NPL)?,
CORP.
FIN.
INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/non-performing-loan-npl/ (last
visited July 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/DG6P-RMDL].
63. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 60.
64. In climate change terms, a borrower could become unable to repay (or collateral impaired)
as a result of physical destruction of a plant or other property for example, or as a result of a
“stranded asset problem.” Part of the stranded asset problem refers to the possibility that certain
physical assets (e.g., coal) will no longer be permitted to be removed from the ground; and yet,
businesses will have already factored their harvesting into balance sheet (and profit) projections.
Ultimately, the nature of the risk to the bank is the same—a climate-related impediment that may
cause a business borrower to be unable to repay a bank loan in whole or part.
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loan losses to record on its balance sheet. 65 In such case, those credit
assets (or securitizations backed by pools of loans to those companies)
could lose value.
But there are a number of existing checks in the underwriting
process to prevent loan impairment that result from borrower defaults.
For one, bank lenders adhere to certain ratios—loan-to-cost (“LTC”), for
construction loans, or loan-to-value (“LTV”), for real estate loans—
which set limits on the riskiness of any loan they make. 66 These ratios
ensure prudence in two different ways. For the bank, the ratio
effectively limits the extent to which a bank is financing a project or
investment with debt. For the borrower, the ratio forces it to
demonstrate sufficient equity or collateral; this will act as a buffer
available for use in repaying the bank’s loan in the event of unforeseen
setbacks and losses.
On average, large BHCs lend at around fifty percent (or lower)
LTC/LTV. 67 This means that a big bank’s loan is very unlikely to
become impaired unless the borrower’s cost of doing business increases
by fifty percent (where the LTC measure was used) or the value of its
collateral declines by fifty percent (where the LTV measure was used).
Accordingly, a corporate or home borrower would have to realize losses
of fifty percent or more due to physical or transition risks in order for

65. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 60, ¶ 81.02,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/federal-reserve-banks/fam/chapter-8-specialtopics.htm#xsubsection-15-8327f811 [https://perma.cc/H763-P5GY].
66. “Cost” refers to the cost of building a commercial project, whereas “value” refers to a home
or other property collateralizing a mortgage.
67. See Commercial Real Estate Lending, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 10
(Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollershandbook/files/commercial-real-estate-lending/pub-ch-commercial-real-estate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GL7N-RPL3] (discussing banks’ authority to establish their own LTV limits);
14–15
(June
9,
2021),
Presale:
Bank
2021-BNK34,
S&P GLOBAL RATINGS
https://www.spglobal.com/_assets/documents/ratings/research/11989266.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LR6A-PCPB] (showing that the majority of loans rated have LTVs of fifty percent
or less).
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climate change to have reduced the quality of asset values on a bank’s
balance sheet. 68 More on this to follow. 69
Perhaps most squarely to the point, it appears that banks may
not presently hold sufficient concentration of carbon-intensive credit
assets for physical or transition risks to threaten their solvency. 70
Consider a snapshot based on existing data. These big bank balance
sheets are geographically and sectorally diversified. 71 Consider recent
data from the balance sheets of the largest, most systemically
68. The stranded asset problem seems even more remote where securitization is concerned.
Again, understanding underwriting is important. By virtue of that process, banks are likely to
have very few incentives (let alone approvals from their risk committees) to securitize pools of
loans to, for example, coal companies (or from analogously carbon-concentrated pools). To do so
would defy the very purpose of securitization—risk and geographic diversification. For that reason,
it seems equally improbable that a bond would be rated investment grade, thereby limiting
demand for such a product. Moreover, given the growing investor-driven consensus that financial
institutions should step away from carbon-facing assets, demand will likely be quite small. See
Christopher Flavelle, Climate Change Poses ‘Systemic Threat’ to the Economy, Big Investors Warn,
N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/climate/investors-climate-threatregulators.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/23S5-5TQN].
69. Some researchers have claimed that that “[w]hile accurately-priced risk and returns are
part of the typical formula for financial portfolio composition, the mispricing of mortgage risk,
carried onto securitizers’ balance sheets, can be a source of unhedged and unanticipated systemic
risk.” Amine Ouazad & Matthew E. Kahn, Mortgage Finance in the Face of Rising Climate Risk 7
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26322, 2019) (citation omitted),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26322/w26322.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8AV3U8U]. However, securitization is subject to much more robust underwriting now as well. Banks
are now much more incentivized than they were before 2008 to conduct due diligence on the loans
that they packaged in securities. Specifically, post-2008 crisis reforms now require banks to retain
a five percent first-loss or ‘vertical’ piece of any securitized bond that they sell. This forces banks
to keep some “skin in the game,” by ensuring their diligence and underwriting practices are robust
to any and all manners of risk associated with the loans that form the basis for a securitization.
70. There are, to be clear, methodological limitations to this assessment, which I
acknowledge. This snapshot does not capture loans to industries that while not necessarily carbon
emitters may be first impacted by physical risk (as opposed to transition risk). It also omits
consideration of banks’ climate exposure from non-C&I loans, and does not attempt to assess other
sectors that could be affected by climate change secondarily. As such, this assessment is presented
as a snapshot but does not purport to represent banks’ aggregate climate exposure. A fulsome
assessment of banks’ aggregate climate exposure is best undertaken by institutions with access to
more granular data, such as bank managers and bank supervisors.
71. While the Fed also oversees small regional and community banks, because their failure
is not generally viewed as a risk to financial stability—and prudential regulation is significantly
less onerous—I do not consider them as the primary example in this Article. Stated another way,
there are not high social costs to the failure or unsound practices of a small regional or community
bank. Congress has acknowledged this in exempting these organizations from some of the
heightened prudential and supervisory requirements imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act. See
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat.
1296 (2018) (codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, 38, 42, 50 U.S.C.). Relatedly, there is a rich
scholarly and policy debate regarding the extent to which size versus activities is the best proxy
for systemic risk; still, it is generally accepted and embedded in our regulatory framework that the
largest bank holding companies pose the greatest systemic risk. See, e,g., Joseph Haubrich &
Charlotte DeKoning, Sizing Up Systemic Risk, FED. RSRV. BANK OF CLEVELAND (Aug. 23, 2017),
https://www.clevelandfed.org/~/media/content/newsroom%20and%20events/publications/economi
c%20commentary/2017/ec%20201713/2017-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4W5-M6N8].
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important banks. For example, at year end 2019, JPMorgan Chase had
$41,570 million in wholesale credit exposures in its oil and gas
portfolio. 72 While that number seems enormous, it is 4.6 percent of that
bank’s total credit exposure. (That number decreased to $37,516 million
by the end of 2020. 73)
At the highest range is Citigroup, whose credit exposure in the
energy and commodities industry constitutes around seven percent of
its total credit exposure for its corporate credit portfolio. 74 Yet other
globally systemically important banks such as Wells Fargo, BNY
Mellon, and Barclays fall at the lower end of the four to seven percent
exposure range in their portfolios (when looking at their exposure to the
oil and gas industry respectively). 75 Meanwhile, the amount of equity
capital available to absorb loan losses is triple or quadruple credit
exposure at all of these big banks. 76
Taking automotive industry loans into account changes these
banks’ exposure slightly, but not significantly. 77 For example,
JPMorgan’s and Wells Fargo’s wholesale credit exposure increases by
less than four percent each, while Citigroup’s credit exposure increases
by 6.86 percent. 78 This remains true even when panning out wider to
account for loans across the entire transportation industry. Including
transportation increases JPMorgan’s credit exposure by less than two
percent, Citigroup’s by less than four percent, Wells Fargo’s by around
2.5 percent, and Barclays’s around one percent. 79 Banks are otherwise
diversified across a range of sectors: real estate, consumer and retail,
technology, industrials, asset managers, banks and financial
72. JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 43, at 110.
73. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 127 (Feb. 23, 2021).
74. Citigroup Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 55 (Aug. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Citigroup
Quarterly Report]. Like JPMorgan, Citigroup’s exposures in some of these carbon-facing industries
are declining. For example, its energy and commodities exposure in relation to total exposures
decreased from 6.71 percent in 2019 to 6.31 percent in 2020. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form
10-K), at 78, 80 (Feb. 26, 2021) [hereinafter Citigroup Annual Report].
75. HSBC USA Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 123 (Aug. 3, 2020); Bank of Am. Corp.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 42 (July 30, 2020); Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report
(Form 10-Q), at 155 (Aug. 6, 2020); Wells Fargo & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 27 (Aug.
4, 2020); Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 27 (Aug. 6, 2020); Morgan
Stanley, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 37 (Aug. 4, 2020).
76. See Citigroup Quarterly Report, supra note 74, at 103; HSBC, supra note 75, at 5; Bank
of Am. Corp., supra note 75, at 53; Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., supra note 75, at 2; Wells Fargo &
Co., supra note 75, at 65; Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., supra note 75 at 52; Morgan Stanley, supra
note 75, at 46.
77. This paragraph draws on disclosures in the banks’ 2020 SEC Form 10-K.
78. JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 73, at 124–25; Citigroup Annual Report, supra note
74, at 78–80; Wells Fargo & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 66 (Feb. 23, 2021).
79. JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 73, at 124–25; Citigroup Annual Report, supra note
74, at 78–80; Wells Fargo, supra note 78, at 66; Barclays PLC, Annual Report (Form 20-F), at 117
(Feb. 18, 2021).
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companies, healthcare, utilities, state and municipal governments,
automotive, chemicals and plastics, metals and mining, central
governments, transportation, insurance, securities firms, and financial
market infrastructures. 80
Events of 2020 lend support to the narrative suggested by the
balance sheet data discussed above. Specifically, in spring of 2020, large
banks faced historic declines in oil prices (which fell below zero dollars)
thanks to COVID-related shelter-in-place orders. 81 While banks
suffered some losses on their wholesale credit portfolios connected to
the oil and gas industry, 82 their soundness or solvency did not come into
question. 83 Indeed, the Fed’s own data shows no statistically significant
increase in nonperforming loans between Q4 2019 and Q1 2020 for the
largest banks 84—for further context, while nonperforming loans were
at about one percent of these banks’ balance sheets after these events
of 2020, shortly after the financial crisis of 2008 they hovered around
3.5 percent. 85 These recent events—and banks’ balance sheet
reactions—suggest that even significant exogenous climate-related
shocks cannot so drastically impair asset quality so as to push banks
toward insolvency. 86 The lesson here is that where banks remained
resilient, in accordance with Basel III requirements, they have been
able to withstand significant exogenous shocks.
It is also unclear whether transition risk will undermine bank
soundness. Well-managed banks continuously adjust for changing
80. JPMorgan’s exposure to oil and gas decreased from 2019 to 2020, from 4.12 percent of
total wholesale loans to 3.47 percent. JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 73, at 124–25. As a
percentage of all loans (wholesale and consumer), oil and gas is 1.7 percent of the balance sheet.
Id.
81. Ryan Dezember, U.S. Oil Costs Less Than Zero After a Sharp Monday Selloff, WALL ST.
J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-oil-is-11-a-barrel-now-but-three-times-that-in-autumn11587392745 (last updated Apr. 21, 2020, 12:49) [https://perma.cc/HSX7-EC7J].
82. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 56 (May 7, 2020)
(noting losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic).
83. The results of the 2020 stress test—conducted amid the COVID-19 pandemic—show that
“[t]he banking system has been a source of strength during this crisis . . . and the results of [the
Fed’s] sensitivity analyses show that [U.S.] banks can remain strong in the face of even the
harshest shocks.” Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board
Releases Results of Stress Tests for 2020 and Additional Sensitivity Analyses Conducted in Light
of the Coronavirus Event (June 25, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200625c.htm
[https://perma.cc/3QDG-J4A9].
84. These are institutions with assets between $100 billion and $300 billion.
85. Nonperforming Loans (Past Due 90+ Days Plus Nonaccrual) to Total Loans for U.S. Banks
with Average Assets Between $100M and $300M, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/US13NPTL (last visited May 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ZU5W4GFD?type=image].
86. It is also worth noting none of these banks approached insolvency following previous
“billion-dollar” natural disasters that occurred between 2004 and 2012, including Hurricanes
Katrina, Irma, and Sandy. Ouazad & Kahn, supra note 69, at 4.
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credit and market conditions, and thus generally prepare for a certain
amount of credit losses in a given year. 87 Climate-related risks are
likely to be no exception. Indeed, several large banks have already
begun to factor climate-related risks into their underwriting process. As
Citigroup explains in a 2019 quarterly report, it “has incorporated
environmental factors like climate risk assessments and reporting
criteria for certain obligors . . . . Factors evaluated include
consideration of climate risk to an obligor’s business and physical assets
and, when relevant, consideration of cost-effective options to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.” 88
This all suggests that banks are already in the process of
adapting their behavior to announced—and thus anticipated—
transition policies by, for example, deleveraging where existing carbon
assets are concerned, or including prepayment obligations for newly
made assets that might be similarly affected. 89 Accordingly, in order for
transition policies to impair asset quality in the future, those policies
would need to be adopted and implemented suddenly and in completely
unforeseen ways. Additionally, any such climate-related policy changes
would need to be globally adopted. If not, at least some carbon-related
businesses could likely shift in region, allowing relocated production to
modulate negative price or demand shocks. Such regulatory arbitrage
would not be possible for all kinds of carbon-unfriendly assets, but to
the extent it were, such agility would further mute the brunt of the
cumulative credit risk.
In summary, the abilities to diversify and plan prudently appear
as market-driven checks against bank vulnerability to climate risk, at
least right now. The implications that follow for the Fed’s
macroprudential supervisory role are considered next.
ii. Climate Risk and Financial Stability
The Fed also has a “macroprudential” role to monitor risks to the
stability of the banking system as a whole. Historically, financial
systems (not just institutions) have been destabilized by a classic-type
scenario: a panic that precipitates a run. Accordingly, in this
macroprudential role, the Fed considers the potential triggers of a panic
and conditions conducive to a run as problems that could be within its
policy bounds.
87. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 43, at 116 (noting an allowance for credit
losses).
88. Citigroup Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 42 (Aug. 1, 2019).
89. See Light & Skinner, supra note 36, at 39–44, 56–57; infra note 99 and accompanying
text (discussing market movement away from climate-related credit risk).
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Consider a paradigmatic panic-and-run example surrounding an
asset-bubble popping. 90 Euphoria or mistake (or fraud) can lead to
overvaluation and overconcentration of a particular asset class. When
the true value of the asset becomes manifest, 91 uncertainty rules the
day and motivates panicked behavior (What is the true value of these
assets? Will my counterparties still pay?), which is propagated by
additional uncertainty regarding how much value has been lost and by
whom. This uncertainty about true asset values—and who holds
what—prompts financial system players to pull back, fearful of further
unknown losses. The result is that short-term funding seizes, 92 asset
values drop, 93 and widespread instability ensues. 94 Insofar as the Fed
is now expected to play a role in supporting short-term funding markets
and to act as lender of last resort to banks, 95 this kind of cycle will likely
always be a problem for the Fed.
Some predict that climate risk is precisely such an unknown risk
lurking on bank balance sheets. 96 Presently, however, there are reasons
90. See Campiglio et al., supra note 2, at 462 (discussing cascading financial effects following
asset valuation diminishment); JAMES LEATON, CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, UNBURNABLE
CARBON: ARE THE WORLD’S FINANCIAL MARKETS CARRYING A CARBON BUBBLE? 18–20 (2011),
https://carbontracker.org/reports/carbon-bubble/ [https://perma.cc/HN8W-TXRZ] (discussing asset
valuation and impairment related to the carbon bubble).
91. These endogenous shocks result in eponymous “Minsky moments” as the market realizes
a substantial amount of underappreciated risk that that has built up in the sector. See Hyman P.
Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working
Paper No. 74, 1992).
92. In situations of market panic, lenders of short-term financing (usually repurchase
agreement or repo financing) are stuck holding collateral that appears to have lost some value. In
response, these lenders will issue margin calls to their borrowers, requiring borrowers to post
additional collateral or cash to bring their contract back in balance. See,
e.g.,
Statement
Regarding Treasury Reserve Management Purchases and Repurchase Operations, FED. RSRV.
BANK
OF
N.Y.
(Mar.
12,
2020),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating_policy_200312a [https://perma.cc/2SHCB2Z4] (discussing repo operation changes resulting from COVID-19 disruptions to financial
markets).
93. Where borrowers do not have the additional funds to meet their margin calls, they must
sell assets into a falling market for a lower-than-market price. Where tainted assets flood the
market, and supply comes up too short, the price of the asset becomes dislodged from its
fundamental value. The asset price dislocations that result from these “fire sales” can fuel market
panic and even prompt lenders to refuse to renew (“rollover”) any more short-term debt.
94. The theory that endogenous forces in capitalist economies push and pull the financial
cycle, resulting in periods of upturn, peak, downturn, and trough—and largely thanks to the
overconsumption of debt assets in good economic times—is largely credited to economist Hyman
Minsky and his “Financial Instability Hypothesis.” See Hyman P. Minsky, The FinancialInstability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behavior of the Economy, in FINANCIAL CRISES:
THEORY, HISTORY, AND POLICY 13–39 (Charles P. Kindleberger & Jean-Pierre Laffargue eds.,
1982).
95. If there are not enough liquid assets to sell to satisfy the liability side of the balance sheet
and the capital cushion is absorbed in full, a bank can become insolvent.
96. Mark Carney, Fifty Shades of Green, FIN. & DEV. 12 (Dec. 2019),
https://www.imf.org/external/chinese/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/12/pdf/a-new-sustainable-financial-
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to think a climate-contagion scenario relatively unlikely. 97 For one,
there is the factual question of how much exposure to such assets really
does exist on banks’ balance sheets. As just discussed, a review of big
banks’ balance sheets shows that they are not, in fact, heavily exposed
to “carbon-intensive” assets, like oil and gas or auto company loans. 98
And evidence gathered by the Basel Committee indicates the market is
already increasingly pricing in climate risk. 99
Securitization, for its part, also seems relatively well buffered
from climate risk. The majority of assets pooled into securitized
products are mortgages and auto loans. 100 Mortgages, on their own,
may be exposed to climate change, but when pooled together perhaps
less so. By design, mortgage bonds are constructed from pools of
mortgages assembled from a highly diverse set of geographic regions.
Absent some physical change that reduces home values across all
geographic regions, the highly rated (e.g., AAA) tranches of the
securities would not be affected. Auto loans might well be a different
story. But again, auto-loan securitizations are unlikely to decline that
system-to-stop-climate-change-carney.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2U7-3E3M]. See generally Gary B.
Gorton, Some Reflections on the Recent Financial Crisis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 18397, 2012), https://www.nber.org/papers/w18397.pdf’ [https://perma.cc/7FG3-K7SS]
(explaining the concept of a “financial crisis”).
97. The Article does, however, acknowledge the role of uncertainty that could well change
this analysis in future periods if new information is discovered. In regard to climate risk, known
sources of uncertainty include “assumptions around future emissions pathways and the impact
that these have on physical hazards, interactions between natural systems, future paths of policy,
technological advances, and consumer and market sentiment.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, supra note 33, at 9. Of course, there is always also the possibility of Knightian
uncertainty: the unknown unknown; or, as Mervyn King and John Kay refer to it, “radical
uncertainty.” See JOHN KAY & MERVYN KING, RADICAL UNCERTAINTY: DECISION-MAKING BEYOND
THE NUMBERS (2020) (“When we describe radical uncertainty . . . [w]e are emphasising the vast
range of possibilities that lie between the world of unlikely events which can nevertheless be
described with the aid of probability distributions, and the world of the unimaginable.”).
98. See supra notes 69–82 and accompanying discussion.
99. As the Basel Committee notes, there are a number of data points suggesting that the
market is moving away from climate-related credit risk, even in the absence of more forwardleaning central bank interventions; this evidence includes, for example, that “financial markets
may be beginning to price in transition risks for corporates,” “investors may already be demanding
compensation” via a “carbon premium” for certain assets, and “flood risks and rises in sea levels
may already be partially priced into selected residential real estate valuations.” BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 33, at 17. Further evidence suggests that “banks reduce
exposures to climate-sensitive assets once identified,” “that some banks improve their capital
positions following repeated natural disasters,” and “that banks are starting to mitigate their
exposure to transition risk drivers.” Id. at 29. The U.S. banking system is further buffered from
climate-related credit risk thanks to the depth of its capital markets which afford banks’ options
for securitization, hedging and derivatives products, which enables them to spread out their
exposure to climate risk. See id. at 27–31. This is seen by the Basel Committee as a helpful
“[m]itigant[ ]” to climate risk. Id. at 27–28.
100. US
Asset
Backed
Securities,
SIFMA
(July
2,
2021),
https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/us-asset-backed-securities-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/44XX-W6WQ] (follow link to downloadable spreadsheet).
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far in value, absent sudden transition policies that make the existing
stock of cars (which collateralize car loans) drop precipitously in value.
While it does seem very likely that future governments will enact
policies requiring cars to run on clean energy, those policies would
presumably take some time and allow for a grandfathered transition.
Thus, while the Fed’s macroprudential role in monitoring
market-wide risks would imply a responsibility related to climate
change if it had the potential to trigger a panic-and-run situation, the
market’s current orientation suggests that climate change does not
presently pose such a risk. 101
B. Climate Change and the Macroeconomy
Climate change is also predicted to impact the broad economy
adversely, thus implicating the Fed’s monetary policy role. 102 Physical
climate changes could trigger demand shocks, for example. Heat waves
that stifle workers in areas without steady air conditioning, or floods
that overrun roads along which they drive to work, could reduce labor
productivity. As basic macroeconomics teaches, lower productivity leads
to lower output overall. Lower output translates to lower profit for a
business. With less revenue, businesses may be forced to reduce
demand for labor, thereby lowering the national employment rate. The
cycle can repeat. Fewer jobs means less income, and in turn reduced
demand for goods and services. If people cannot work, they cannot
spend; and extreme weather events caused by climate change can
prevent them from working, going out, and spending, which has a direct
impact on demand for consumer goods and services.
One can also imagine price stability implications. Extreme
weather events—and high temperatures in particular—could in theory
impact the production of certain agricultural products and commodities
like cereals, dairy, meat, coffee, and sugar. 103 And as production

101. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
102. One way the economy could suffer from climate change is via spillovers from the financial
system. The problem is simple enough to explain: where the financial system seizes up, it cannot
keep on lending. When businesses and households are starved of credit, spending and investment
will slow down. In turn, output and GDP decline and employment often falls. As economist and
former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke has long theorized, the consequences of financial crises are “real.”
Ben S. Bernanke, The Real Effects of Disrupted Credit: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis,
in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 251 (Janice C. Eberly & James H. Stock eds., 2018). The
possibility of a climate-induced crisis has been discussed above.
103. Dina Fine Maron, Extreme Weather Events Helps Drive Food Prices to New Highs, SCI.
AM. (Jan. 6, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/extreme-weather-helps-drive-food/
[https://perma.cc/4VMM-69NE]; Emiko Terazono, Climate Extremes Inflate Food Prices, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/5c4500fc-a518-11e3-8988-00144feab7de
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fluctuates, so too would the pricing of those commodities and the
markets in which they trade. 104 Indeed, consultants at Oliver Wyman
remarked in 2014 that “[a]gricultural prices have entered an new age
of volatility” because of extreme weather events. 105 This kind of price
instability invites the possibility of supply shocks and “stagflation.” 106
Initially, a reduction in the supply of goods or services drives prices
much higher. 107 As policymakers learned from their experience with oil
supply shocks in the 1970s and 1980s, movement in the price of certain
goods and services that are central to economic life—like oil or food—
can pave the way for inflation as central banks become accommodative
to counteract accompanying output dips. 108
But these scenarios are still hypotheticals, not present or
imminent events. And monetary policy responds to real, observed
changes in the economy and to shocks—generally, it does not move to
anticipate these things ahead of their fruition. 109
*

*

*

[https://perma.cc/A94H-T4DU]; see also Cœuré, Speech, supra note 24, at 2 (noting that weather
events impact harvests and put pressure on food prices).
104. Thomas Chatzopoulos, Ignacio Pérez Domínguez, Matteo Zampieri & Andrea Toreti,
Extreme Weather and Global Agricultural Markets: Experimental Analysis of the Impacts of Heat
Waves on Wheat Markets, 2017 INT’L J. ON FOOD SYS. DYNAMICS 448, 448.
105. MICHAEL DENTON, MARK ROBSON & ALEX WITTENBERG, OLIVER WYMAN, SEPARATING
THE WHEAT FROM THE CHAFF 2 (Sept. 2010), https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliverwyman/global/en/files/archive/2010/OW_EN_PUBL_GRT_2011_Wheat_From_Chaff.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AR97-WQW7].
106. See Wing Thye Woo, Opinion, Inflation Amidst Recession: Policy Prescriptions for
(May
14,
2008),
Sustaining
Stable
Growth,
BROOKINGS
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/inflation-amidst-recession-policy-prescriptions-forsustaining-stable-growth/ [https://perma.cc/B7A7-FG5V].
107. Edward M. Gramlich, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the
Annual Economic Luncheon at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Sept. 16, 2004),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040916/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/V2NK-L9LN].
108. Id. It is classic macroeconomic theory that an adverse supply shock shifts the short-run
aggregate supply curve left, leading to lower output and higher inflation. What Are the Possible
Causes and Consequences of Higher Oil Prices on the Overall Economy?, FED. RSRV. BANK OF S.F.
(Nov. 2007), https://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2007/november/oil-pricesimpact-economy/ [https://perma.cc/867N-HG8T]. Oil price changes can impact the macroeconomy
more broadly because of the large number of products made with petroleum, thereby shifting up
the supply curve more generally for a larger basket of goods. Id. Oil prices could also impact
demand for other goods because they reduce wealth and increase uncertainty about the future. Id.
109. See Christopher J. Waller, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Speech at
the Peterson Institute for International Economics: Treasury–Federal Reserve Cooperation and
the
Importance
of
Central
Bank
Independence
(Mar.
29,
2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20210329a.htm [https://perma.cc/BT85ZC8L].
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To summarize: Part I has engaged the growing chorus of
scholars and policymakers who have urged climate risk as a financial
risk. In doing so, it has placed some factual parameters around the
question, to be considered in Part II, of which policy tools are lawfully
available to the Fed in addressing climate risks.
II. THE LAW OF THE FED AND CLIMATE CHANGE
The Federal Reserve, like all other independent agencies, has
responsibilities mandated by statute and powers delimited in law. To
be sure, the legal framework that governs the Fed is complex and
multifaceted; after all, the Fed wears many hats. In regard to the
economy, the Fed has legal power to set and pursue monetary policy.
Against the policy-oriented backdrop of Part I, this Part considers the
myriad formal sources of legal authority that empower the Fed to act
as monetary authority, firm regulator and supervisor, and researchand data-gatherer. It examines the extent to which any of the Fed’s
powers allow it to take action to tackle climate risk.
A. Board of Governors Powers
In the Fed’s decentralized system of central banking, the Board
of Governors holds most of the legal power. The Fed Board, together
with the Federal Open Market Committee (“FOMC”), is responsible for
monetary policymaking. It also sets supervisory and regulatory policy,
while leaning on the Reserve Banks for day-to-day supervision and
policy support. There is a collection of well-established legal
frameworks that construe the Fed’s mandates, and its powers, in each
of these three areas.
1. Monetary Policy
The Federal Reserve Act clearly defines the Fed’s mandate as
regards its monetary policy. Section 2A of that Act establishes these
objectives as “promot[ing] effectively the goals of maximum
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” 110
Conventionally, most central banks—the Fed included—pursue
their statutory objective of price stability (often targeting somewhere
around two percent inflation 111 ) and employment (if applicable) by

110. Federal Reserve Act § 2A, 12 U.S.C. § 225a.
111. Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.
1
(Jan.
26,
2021),
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setting short-term interest rates. 112 The Fed affects market interest
rates by targeting the federal funds rate, which is the rate banks charge
one another when they lend their Federal Reserve Bank reserves to
each other, usually on a short-term basis. 113 The targeted federal funds
rate is periodically decided by the FOMC. 114 The Fed can steer the fed
funds rate toward the FOMC’s target by buying or selling securities
(usually, U.S. treasuries) in the open market (“open market
operations”), thereby affecting the supply of reserves within the system
and banks’ incentives to lend them to each other. Since 2008, however,
the Fed has principally used adjustments to the interest rate it offers
banks on their reserves (“IOR”) to accomplish the target rate. 115
The FOMC meets eight times throughout the year and evaluates
the status of the economy. It considers a range of macroeconomic
indicators regarding the strength of the labor market, the pace of
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_LongerRunGoals.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9EW-RKLS].
112. COMM. ON THE GLOB. FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, UNCONVENTIONAL
MONETARY
POLICY
TOOLS:
A
CROSS-COUNTRY
ANALYSIS
8
(Oct.
2019),
https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs63.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3QHW-DRUT]
[hereinafter
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY].
113. Effective Federal Funds Rate, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS: FRED ECON. RSCH.,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS (last visited July 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/C6V9CR3Z].
114. The FOMC has a separate legal existence from the Board of Governors. See Federal
Reserve Act § 12A, 12 U.S.C. § 263(c) (creating and authorizing the FOMC); Id. § 14, 12 U.S.C.
§ 355 (empowering Reserve Banks to conduct open market operations). For a more detailed
explanation of how the FOMC conducts monetary policy, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV.
SYS., Conducting Monetary Policy, in THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 20
(10th ed. 2016).
115. Post-2008, the Fed adjusts the interest rate that banks earn on their reserves (“IOR”)—
which is an administered rate—in order to “nudge” the market-determined federal funds rate. This
is because, today, the Fed opts to remain in an “ample” reserve environment thus rendering
slightly moot its prior efforts to affect the amount of reserves as a means of influencing the money
supply. See Jane Ihrig & Scott Wolla, How Does the Fed Influence Interest Rates Using Its New
Tools, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.stlouisfed.org/openvault/2020/august/how-does-fed-influence-interest-rates-using-new-tools [https://perma.cc/K4BEVDSD] (explaining these frameworks); see also Laura Hopper, What Are Open Market Operations?
Monetary Policy Tools, Explained, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2019/august/open-market-operations-monetary-policytools-explained [https://perma.cc/JG5B-95JY]; John R. Walter & Renee Courtois, The Effect of
Interest on Reserves on Monetary Policy, FED. RSRV. BANK OF RICHMOND 2 (Dec. 2009). In recent
years, the interest rate on excess reserves policy has been necessary to supplement OMO in
achieving the FOMC’s target rate because
[w]hen banks have excess liquidity or reserves [as they do today], they can choose
whether to lend those reserves to other banks (at the federal funds rate) or deposit them
at the Fed (and earn the IOER). Banks aren’t willing to lend to each other if the federal
funds rate is substantially lower than the IOER, and so the two rates move closely
together.
Paying Interest on Excess Reserves, FRED: THE FRED BLOG (June 18, 2018),
https://fredblog.stlouisfed.org/2018/06/paying-interest-on-excess-reserves/
[https://perma.cc/Q37L-PBGU].
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economic activity, job growth, household spending, and inflation. 116 If
economic indicators suggest the economy could be overheating, the
FOMC might raise the target federal funds rate to lean against the
winds. 117 Conversely, if the FOMC perceives a need to support a
foundering economy, it will act in the reverse and lower the target
interest rate. To the extent climate change had a demonstrable and
proven impact on any of these factors, 118 it would be well within the
FOMC’s policy authority to adjust, as necessary, the target federal
funds rate. But such economic impact would be more likely the result of
some exogenous shock to the economy precipitated by sudden climate
changes or severe weather events rather than the result of gradual,
physical changes. 119
There is considerably less legal support, however, for the Fed’s
use of its so-called unconventional monetary policy tools to proactively
mitigate climate change. 120 Unconventional monetary policies were
innovated by central banks around the world after the 2008 crisis,
which exposed the limits of what conventional monetary policy tools
could do to boost a spiraled economy. 121 Having lowered the interest

116. See, e.g., Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RSRV.
SYS.
(Jan.
28–29,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20200129.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N558-4L2Z] (reproducing the FOMC’s wide-ranging discussion from one of its
eight yearly meetings).
117. The FOMC does this by buying and selling government securities in the open market. Id.
at 4, 19. It can increase money in circulation—i.e., liquidity—by buying bonds; this will decrease
the federal funds rate. Id. at 14. Conversely, if the FOMC sells bonds, it laps up liquidity from the
market, which should cause the federal funds rate to increase. Id. at 13–14.
118. See supra Part I.B (discussing climate change and the macroeconomy).
119. The Fed cut the targeted federal funds rate in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, just
as it had in response to unexpected exogenous shocks and economic disturbances in decades past.
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement
(Mar.
15,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200315a.htm
[https://perma.cc/6439-VP67].
120. Unconventional monetary policy is not aimed at short-term interest rates.
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY, supra note 112, at 10. Rather, unconventional monetary
policy is intended to influence long-term risk-free rates, restore liquidity in markets, narrow
widened credit spreads, and steady wobbling asset values. Id. Tools fell in two camps: some that
directly purchased assets, by passing the usual money market channels; others that directly
affected credit conditions by supplying plentiful liquidity to banks. Id.
121. See id. at 6 (“The recovery from the [2008] recession was also uncharacteristically
slow . . . and pushed central banks to resort to actions that departed from their established policy
frameworks.”); see also Mark Carlson & Burcu Duygan-Bump, “Unconventional” Monetary Policy
as Conventional Monetary Policy: A Perspective from the U.S. in the 1920s, FED. RSRV. BD. (Jan.
25,
2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018019pap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7RTH-ELAM] (providing a historical perspective on the Fed’s monetary policy
tools).
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rate to its lowest bound—zero percent—there was nowhere left for
central banks to go to stimulate conditions. 122
Unconventional tools were thus developed to spur the economy
upward in different kinds of ways. Perhaps the most famous of these
tools harnesses the balance sheet of the central bank. The tool, now
known as “quantitative easing,” involves large-scale purchases of
certain kinds of debt assets, like mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) or
government debt (i.e., Treasuries). 123 The mechanics are as follows: by
purchasing debt assets, the central bank increases demand for the
asset, thereby increasing its price. The price and yield (i.e., interest
rate) of debt securities are inversely related; therefore, as price goes up,
the rates on these instruments go down. 124 Lower interest rates
generally tend to ignite economic activity as businesses are better able
to finance new investments and then able to hire more employees and
provide them with income—their income then translates into additional
spending and investment. 125
The quantitative easing (“QE”) that followed the 2008 crisis 126
aimed to increase the flow of credit in private markets by supporting
the mortgage housing market. 127 To that end, the Fed purchased $200
billion in federal agency debt and $1.25 trillion in MBS. Further, to
lower interest rates generally, the Fed bought $300 billion in long-term
Treasury securities. 128 Over a decade later, the Fed initiated another
round of asset purchases in March 2020, in response to the market

122. In monetary economics, this is referred to as the “effective lower bound” (“ELB”).
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY, supra note 112, at 9–10. It seemed that over the years
preceding the crisis, consumers and financial institutions had become too practiced at bracing for
changes in the short-term interest rates. Id. at 8–9.
123. See Lowell R. Ricketts, Quantitative Easing Explained, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS:
LIBER8 ECON. INFO. NEWSL. (Apr. 2011), https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/pageoneeconomics/uploads/newsletter/2011/201104.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6G9T-ZF45];
Stephen
Williamson, Quantitative Easing: How Well Does This Tool Work?, FED RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS
(Aug.
18,
2017),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/third-quarter2017/quantitative-easing-how-well-does-this-tool-work [https://perma.cc/ML3T-K4KH].
124. Ricketts, supra note 123, at 1.
125. Id. at 2. Quantitative easing aims at medium-term (not short-term) interest rates, so is
distinct from other monetary policy tools in that regard. Brett W. Fawley & Luciana Juvenal,
Quantitative Easing: Lessons We’ve Learned, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (July 1, 2012),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/july-2012/quantitative-easing-lessonsweve-learned [https://perma.cc/B2J9-TUT2].
126. This round of QE began in March 2009 and ended in March 2010. Ricketts, supra note
123, at 2. Apparently, QE was not unique to the 2008 crisis; it had been used in the 1930s. Richard
G. Anderson, The First U.S. Quantitative Easing: The 1930s, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS: ECON.
SYNOPSES (June 30, 2010), https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/es/10/ES1017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6HF-Y4C9].
127. Ricketts, supra note 123, at 2.
128. Id. at 1–2.
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fallout that accompanied the COVID-19 pandemic. 129 As before, the
FOMC purchased Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities
from the government sponsored entities. 130
Various central banks in Europe—most notably the European
Central Bank (“ECB”)—now favor a new breed of QE that is addressed
toward mitigating climate change. 131 The initiative to pursue “green
QE” essentially involves the ECB adjusting its asset holdings to
increase its portfolio of so-called green bonds. 132 As the name suggests,
a green bond is a debt security whose proceeds finance green
investment projects or those with some positive environmental
impact. 133 Described by the ECB, “these debt instruments are
increasingly used by companies, governments and financial institutions
to finance the adoption of more energy-efficient technologies, reduce
carbon emissions and reorient business models towards sustainable
economic activities.” 134 By purchasing green bonds, the ECB believes it
will be successful in promoting the growth of green financial

129. On March 15, 2020, the FOMC committed to increase the Fed’s holdings of Treasury
securities and agency MBS “in the amounts needed to support smooth market functioning and
effective transmission of monetary policy to broader financial conditions,” without an explicit limit.
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Announces Extensive New
Measures
to
Support
the
Economy
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200323b.htm
[https://perma.cc/3RLW-K7S8] [hereinafter Press Release, New Measures]. The FOMC also
expanded open-market purchases to include agency CMBS. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200323a.htm
[https://perma.cc/N4KR-N5KV].
130. Press Release, New Measures, supra note 129.
131. See,
e.g.,
Corporate
Sector
Purchase
Programme,
EUR. CENT. BANK,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/app/html/index.en.html#cspp (last visited May 22,
2021) [https://perma.cc/AH6B-QPJK]; Public Sector Purchase Programme, EUR. CENT. BANK,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html#pspp (last visited May 22,
2021) [https://perma.cc/GQ67-HDHH].
132. Roberto A. De Santis, Katja Hettler, Madelaine Roos & Fabio Tamburrini, Purchases of
Green Bonds Under the Eurosystem’s Asset Purchase Programme, EUR. CENT. BANK: ECON. BULL.,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2018/html/ecb.ebbox201807_01.en.html
(last visited July 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/U33V-N32X]. Hungary is also considering such a
program. Press Release, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Magyar Nemzeti Bank Among the First Central
Banks to Create a Dedicated Green Bond Portfolio Within Foreign Exchange Reserves (June 20,
2019),
https://www.mnb.hu/en/pressroom/press-releases/press-releases-2019/magyar-nemzetibank-among-the-first-central-banks-to-create-a-dedicated-green-bond-portfolio-within-foreignexchange-reserves [https://perma.cc/42YA-RDCA].
133. EUR. CENT. BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE EURO 20 (June 2020),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ire/ecb.ire202006~81495c263a.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD2NHXP7].
134. Id.
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investments and generally lowering the cost of capital for those
companies that invest in clean energy. 135
The ECB has now been purchasing green bonds under various
asset purchase programs for several years. 136 It is fair to say that the
ECB is the largest single buyer of the green bonds in the European
markets. By 2018, the ECB had purchased twenty-four percent of the
€48 billion pool of eligible green public sector bonds and twenty percent
of the €31 billion pool of eligible green corporate bonds. 137 By the ECB’s
standards, its green asset purchases seem to have had their intended
effect of incentivizing more green debt. EU residents are the largest
issuers of green bonds; in 2019, over half of the global issuance of green
bonds was denominated in euros. 138
However, the green version of QE does not sit well with U.S.
139
law. On its face, the text of section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act does
not endorse purchases of private bonds. 140 That provision provides a list
of the debt securities that the Fed “shall have power” to buy. 141 It
includes gold, Treasury bonds, bonds guaranteed by a government
agency (i.e., MBS from the government-sponsored enterprises
135. Id. In 2018, the ECB stated that, while its asset purchase program did buy green bonds,
that program did not cater to an “explicit environmental target.” De Santis et al., supra note 132.
However, in January 2021, the ECB shifted to a policy of using its “own funds portfolio to invest
in [a] euro-denominated green bond investment fund” thereby “contribut[ing], within its mandate,
to global efforts to promote environmental objectives.” Press Release, ECB to Invest in Bank for
International
Settlement’s
Green
Bond
Fund,
Jan.
25,
2021,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2021/html/ecb.pr210125~715adb4e2b.en.html,
136. De Santis et al., supra note 132.
137. Tommy Stubbington & Martin Arnold, Pushback and Practicalities Limit Hopes for
‘Green QE’ from ECB, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/d3f52ba6-fef2-11e9b7bc-f3fa4e77dd47 [https://perma.cc/4PG8-KBFW].
138. Id.; EUR. CENT. BANK, supra note 133, at 20.
139. This is not to say that green QE is clearly legal as a matter of EU law. To be sure, even
within the ECB, green QE has its critics. See Piotr Skolimowski & Yuko Takeo, Weidmann Warns
Green QE Could Overburden ECB Monetary Policy, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-29/ecb-s-weidmann-warns-green-qe-couldoverburden-monetary-policy [https://perma.cc/Y4CD-Q34T] (detailing the position of the
Bundesbank CEO).
140. More specifically, section 14 empowers the Fed to buy assets in the open market as a
means of influencing interest rates and the amount of money (and credit) in circulation. Federal
Reserve Act § 14, 12 U.S.C. § 355. Although section 14 allocates power to the Reserve banks to buy
and sell assets in the open market, because unconventional monetary policy is a Board-prescribed
policy directed to the Reserve banks to orchestrate, it is considered in this Part II.A in connection
with Board powers. Granted, however, because section 14(2) gives the Fed the authority to
purchase state and municipal bonds, the Fed theoretically could buy bonds issued by these
localities to finance a transition. 12 U.S.C. § 355.
141. 12 U.S.C. § 355; see also Glenn D. Rudebusch, Climate Change and the Federal Reserve,
FED. RSRV. BANK OF S.F.: ECON. LETTER (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.frbsf.org/economicresearch/publications/economic-letter/2019/march/climate-change-and-federal-reserve/
[https://perma.cc/4PWJ-C3ZY] (discussing the impacts that climate change will have on the Fed’s
duty to provide macroeconomic and financial stability).
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(“GSEs”)), municipal bonds, and bonds issued by the now defunct Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation. 142 There is no mention of bonds issued from
private sector businesses. 143
Admittedly, the Fed purchased private corporate bonds in 2020
while fighting the economic crisis spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic.
But the 2020 asset purchases were not part of QE—rather, they were
structured as emergency liquidity assistance under the Fed’s LOLR
authority, derived from section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. 144
Decidedly, green QE could not be authorized under section 13(3). 145 A
proactive plan to use bond-buying to make the financial system greener
is not by definition an action aimed to provide “liquidity to the financial
system,” 146 nor is it a financial crisis-fighting measure.
Not only does the text of sections 13(3) and 14 seem to preclude
green QE, so too does the Fed’s monetary policy mandate. Section 2A of
the Federal Reserve Act broadly specifies the Fed’s monetary policy
objectives. 147 The Fed must pursue price stability and maximum
employment, with a view to “accommodating commerce and
business.” 148 There is no mention of additional green goals.
A point of comparison here is useful. Consider the monetary
policy mandate of ECB, which explicitly requires due consideration be
given to the environment in executing monetary policy. The formative
treaty of the ECB—the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union—sets out its monetary policy objectives:

142. 12 U.S.C. §§ 354–55.
143. Regulation putting flesh on section 14 does stretch the purpose of the provision somewhat,
by stipulating that Reserve Banks are “authorized and directed to engage in such other operations
as the Committee may from time to time determine to be reasonably necessary to the effective
conduct of open market operations and the effectuation of open market policies.” 12 C.F.R.
§ 270.4(d) (2021).
144. 12 U.S.C. § 343. As part of these 2020 facilities, the Fed purchased corporate bonds and
corporate bond ETFs—assets not specifically listed in section 14. Press Release, Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (June 29, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200629a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P85S-F62P]; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal
Reserve Board Announces Updates to Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF),
Which Will Begin Buying a Broad and Diversified Portfolio of Corporate Bonds to Support Market
Liquidity and the Availability of Credit for Large Employers (June 15, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200615a.htm
[https://perma.cc/E8J7-G3EW].
145. This assumes that it would be lawful for the Fed to seek to interpret its statutory power
beyond what is set out explicitly in the text of section 14. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
146. 12 U.S.C. § 343; see also Christina Parajon Skinner, Central Bank Activism, 71 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2021) (on file with author).
147. 12 U.S.C. § 225(a).
148. Id. §§ 225(a), 357.
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The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks . . . shall be to maintain
price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support
the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement
of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European
Union. 149

Elsewhere in the Treaty, Article 11 makes plain that
environmental protection is one of the “general economic policies” of the
Union that must be factored in and “contributed to” through the use of
monetary policy tools. It provides that
[e]nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and
implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to
promoting sustainable development. 150

It is common for European central banks to include reference to
governmental objectives in their statutory objectives. 151
The Bank of England is similarly mandated. The Bank’s
monetary policy mandate is set out in the Bank of England Act 1998
and has a secondary objective of “supporting the economic policy of Her
Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and
employment.” 152 The Act provides for a Monetary Policy Remit between
HM Treasury (“HMT”) and the Bank and that is where HMT sets out
what its economic policy is. Indeed, in the 2021 Remit letter, HMT
specified that the MPC should take sustainability considerations in
view in fashioning monetary policy. 153
But not so under U.S. law. The Federal Reserve Act does not
include such secondary objectives. In the absence of such instruction to
“have regard” to the government’s social or economic policy, it is likely
too strained to interpret section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act to allow
green asset purchases in the open market, or the use of section 13 to
legitimatize those purchases indirectly in the interest of emergency
liquidity assistance.

149. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 127,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 102 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at art. 11.
151. See Rosa Maria Lastra & Kern Alexander, Pol’y Dep’t for Econ., Sci. & Quality of Life
Policies, Eur. Parliament, The ECB Mandate: Perspectives on Sustainability and Solidarity (June
2020),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/648813/IPOL_IDA(2020)648813_EN
.pdf [https://perma.cc/R78Y-PNEZ].
152. The Bank of England Act, for example, mandates the Financial Policy Committee. Bank
of England Act 1998, c. 11, pt. 1A, § 9C (UK). Its monetary policy objectives are similarly worded.
Id. § 11.
153. Letter from Rishi Sunak to Andrew Bailey, Governor, Bank of Eng. (Mar. 3, 2021).

2021]

CENTRAL BANKS AND CLIMATE CHANGE

1333

2. Regulation
The Fed is the primary prudential regulator for a number of
large financial institutions. These include bank holding companies and
financial holding companies, as well as any nonbank financial
institution that has been designated by the Financial Stability
Oversight Council as systemically important. 154 The Fed’s legal
authority to regulate these financial institutions comes from a wide
range of statutes, and results in a large body of banking regulation,
impossible to canvas here. Nevertheless, one body of bank regulation
sits closest to the conversation surrounding climate risk as credit risk:
risk-based capital requirements. 155
All federally insured depository institutions are subject to some
kind of capital requirements. 156 The principal rationale for requiring
minimum capital charges is anchored in resilience—namely, so that
banks can “continue lending to creditworthy households and businesses
even after unforeseen losses and during severe economic downturns.” 157
Capital requirements pertain to the composition of a bank’s
sources of funding. In particular, they require banks to maintain a
certain amount of funding that is fully loss-absorbing, like shareholder
equity and retained earnings (in the first instance), and then other
kinds of additional capital instruments that could absorb losses after a
bank passes the point of nonviability. 158
This is to say that equity sits in the first-loss position of the
capital stack. Higher up the capital stack is short-term unsecured debt,
longer-term and secured debt of various priorities, and—for a deposittaking bank—current accounts (i.e., deposits). As an accounting matter,
these sources of funding represent the liability side of a bank balance
sheet (though equity is technically not a liability). Minimum capital

154. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., Supervising and Regulating Financial
Institutions and Activities, in THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note
114, at 72, 74–75.
155. The other primary categories of bank regulation concern liquidity, leverage, and the
nature of proprietary trading; but they are not relevant to climate change and credit risk.
DEPOSIT
INS.
CORP.,
156. Regulatory
Capital,
FED.
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/capital/capital/index.html (last visited May 23, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/F5TW-85SZ].
157. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board
Invites Comment on Three Proposed Rules Intended to Help Ensure Banks Maintain Strong
Capital
Positions
(June
7,
2012),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20120607a.htm
[https://perma.cc/N4KM-EMYL].
158. Fin. Stability Inst., Definition of Capital in Basel III – Executive Summary, BANK FOR
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsisummaries/defcap_b3.pdf (last visited July 18,
2021) [https://perma.cc/2AX2-2JNU].
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requirements therefore exist to ensure that banks maintain a cushion
of equity that is sufficient to absorb asset-value losses before the bank
approaches insolvency. Stated another way, a bank can remain solvent
so long as its debt liabilities do not exceed its assets.
The largest financial institutions are subject to the most
stringent set of these rules, which are agreed on an international level
by a committee of the world’s central banks. This committee, known as
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 159 gathers periodically to
discuss a variety of banking standards designed to ensure the safety
and soundness of internationally active banks. Its workstreams focus
on a number of regulatory, supervisory, and governance issues, but its
most significant contribution is a global capital regime. The Basel
Committee also agrees what those risk weights should be—that is, the
factor by which each category of asset or exposure is multiplied in order
to determine the capital charge. Risk-based capital ratios are thus equal
to the amount of regulatory capital that is held (in the numerator)
divided by the amount of risk-weighted assets (“RWAs”) (in the
denominator). 160 The latest of these Accords—Basel III—was agreed to
in 2010 and formed in reaction to the 2008 financial crisis. Basel III
significantly increased Core Equity Tier (“CET”) 1 equity capital
requirements to 4.5 percent of a bank’s risk-weighted assets. 161
Each central bank is then responsible for implementing the
agreed standards through the proper domestic law channels. For the
U.S. bank regulators, this means that Basel rules can only be formally
implemented as domestic regulation through the notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedure that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)
requires. 162 Basel III coincided nicely with Dodd-Frank reforms, which
required the Fed to reconsider its capital rules in order to make them
more stringent for certain large financial institutions. Specifically,
section 171 of Dodd-Frank required the federal banking agencies
(including the Fed) to establish minimum capital requirements for
certain banking institutions. It provides:
159. Basel III: International Regulatory Framework for Banks, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last visited July 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/H436-Q6AQ].
160. See DAVID ZARING, THE GLOBALIZED GOVERNANCE OF FINANCE (2020). For a helpful
illustration of the operationalization of the Basel regime, see U.S. Basel III Final Rule:
Standardized
Risk
Weights
Tool,
DAVIS
POLK
&
WARDWELL
LLP,
http://usbaseliii.com/tool/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2021) [https://perma.cc/J3DT-8NG5].
161. Basel standards are minima. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 159.
162. 5 U.S.C. § 533; see, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 217, 225 (2021) (notice-and-comment rules
revising regulatory capital requirements and implementing Basel III); see Basel Regulatory
Framework: U.S. Implementation of the Basel Accords, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/basel/USImplementation.htm (last updated March
8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/VGN6-TSLY] (tracking U.S. implementation).
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The appropriate Federal banking agencies shall establish minimum risk-based capital
requirements on a consolidated basis for insured depository institutions, depository
institution holding companies, and nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board
of Governors. The minimum risk-based capital requirements established under this
paragraph shall not be less than the generally applicable risk-based capital requirements,
which shall serve as a floor for any capital requirements that the agency may require, nor
quantitatively lower than the generally applicable risk-based capital requirements that
were in effect for insured depository institutions as of the date of enactment of this Act. 163

The final Fed Board rule fulfilling that mandate, and also implementing
Basel III, is known as Regulation Q. 164
Inevitably, capital requirements create incentives that influence
a bank’s investment decisions. As a basic matter of corporate finance, it
is relatively more efficient for banks to fund their investments with debt
than with equity. 165 Thus, all things equal, banks will seek to hold the
minimum level of capital that is permissible and populate the
remainder of their capital stack with short- and long-term debt.
Accordingly, regulators can alter firm behavior by adjusting the ratio of
capital to RWA required, or by adjusting the risk weights attached to
certain categories of assets. If certain asset categories become relatively
more costly than others, all else being equal, such regulatory changes
can incentivize banks to move away from those investments and toward
others with lower capital charge requirements. 166
As such, some policymakers have proposed altering the capital
regime to reduce bank’s appetite for climate-related assets. For
example, the EU Commission has considered whether to ease capital
requirements for banks that provide climate-friendly loans.
Policymakers in various jurisdictions have also discussed increased risk
weights for loans to companies that are determined to have a heavy
carbon footprint (or vice versa, to reduce risk weights for loans to
companies with green footprints). 167
163. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 171(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1436 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371(b)(2)).
164. 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (2021) (Regulation Q). Title 12 of the United States Code provides the
Fed with a number of other statutory bases of authority for setting capital rules. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.
§ 248(d) (authorizing the Fed to “supervise and regulate” the issuance and retirement of notes).
165. Because equity holders can lose the entirety of their investment, whereas debtholders are
legally entitled to repayment, the buyers of equity demand a premium on their investment. The
interest paid on debt is also tax deductible. There are also a range of negative market signals
associated with equity raising, which generally imply some weakness at the bank. But see Franco
Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) (setting out the now famous theory which posits that
corporations should be indifferent between funding themselves with debt versus equity).
166. Martin Sandbu, Lagarde’s Green Push in Monetary Policy Would Be Huge Step, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/89f5f412-12bc-11ea-a225-db2f231cfeae
[https://perma.cc/D53P-FM5C].
167. It bears noting that there is a considerable amount of international work taking place in
this space. This includes the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) activities
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Any of these options are technically possible as a matter of law.
The Fed, like any other agency, can change its rules (including capital
rules) by going through a notice-and-comment rulemaking process. But
there could be some practical obstacles in the way. For one, any decision
to increase capital charges would need to be reasonable and based on
evidence. The APA creates a process by which rules may be set aside if
“arbitrary” and “capricious.” 168 Pursuant to that standard, a federal
court may reverse an agency rule if it has “relied on factors Congress
did not intend it to consider” or “offered an explanation [for its decision]
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency.” 169 Accordingly, to
survive, any such change in capital rules would need to be based on firm
data evidencing the increased relative riskiness of climate-related
assets. And that evidence could not be abstract or subjectively
interpreted. This may be challenging to do at present.
Additionally, on the arbitrary side of the ledger, altering risk
weights vis-à-vis some corporate loans would appear in tension with
other legislation that indicates Congress’s desire to prevent distinctions
among corporate exposures. 170 Finally, the nature of risk-based capital
requirements naturally re-weights assets when their value changes: if
a borrower’s creditworthiness or collateral declines during the lifetime
of a loan, the LTV ratio of that loan increases, thereby increasing the
risk weight of the loan and commensurate capital charges. Piling on to
this effect may well seem capricious.

with the Sustainable Insurance Forum, the Basel Committee’s Task Force on Climate Related
Financial Risks, the FSB’s Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures, and IOSCO and
the Sustainable Finance Network. See Joint SIF-IAIS Issues Paper on Climate Change Risks to
the Insurance Sector Released for Public Consultation, SUSTAINABLE INS. F. (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://www.sustainableinsuranceforum.org/joint-sif-iais-issues-paper-on-climate-change-risksto-the-insurance-sector-released-for-public-consultation/ [https://perma.cc/PF64-P23T]; BASEL
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL
RISKS: A SURVEY ON CURRENT INITIATIVES (Apr. 2020), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d502.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6MQ-V7X8]; TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, FIN.
STABILITY BD., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURES (June 2017), https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/60/2020/10/FINAL-2017-TCFDReport-11052018.pdf [https://perma.cc/V68A-CBGT]; INT’L ORG. OF SECS. COMM’NS, SUSTAINABLE
FINANCE AND THE ROLE OF SECURITIES REGULATORS AND IOSCO (Apr. 2020),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD652.pdf [https://perma.cc/M83W-G3QQ].
168. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
169. E.g., Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
170. Dodd-Frank section 939 prohibits banking agencies from using credit ratings in bank
capital rules, thereby ensuring that the United States applies a uniform risk weight to all
corporate credit exposures. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (2010).
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3. Supervision
The Fed also has a role in supervising financial institutions that
is separate and distinct from its role as a regulator. It has both a
microprudential role to supervise firms individually for their safety and
soundness, and a macroprudential role to supervise firms more
collectively to monitor financial system stability. 171
i. Microprudential Supervision
The basis of the Fed’s microprudential role is the Bank Holding
Company (“BHC”) Act of 1956. 172 Section 5 of that Act empowers the
Board to “make examinations of each bank holding company and each
subsidiary thereof.” 173 That provision further empowers the Board to
“issue such regulations and orders as may be necessary to enable it to
administer and carry out the purposes of this Act and prevent evasions
thereof.” 174 Over the years, the Fed’s mandate for firm-level supervision
has been framed in terms of “safety and soundness.” 175 This language
comes both from the BHC Act, which states as one of its purposes the
“safe” operation of bank holding companies, as well as the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement (“FDI”) Act. The FDI Act
specifies a mandate for the Fed to supervise financial institutions to
ensure that they are safe and sound. 176 As such, “the Federal Reserve
is responsible for supervising and regulating certain segments of the
financial industry to ensure they employ safe and sound business
practices and comply with all applicable laws and regulations.” 177

171. The Fed has had a supervisory mandate since its inception. The original text of the 1913
Federal Reserve Act made plain that Congress contemplated the central bank to supervise banking
in the United States. See H.R. 7837, 63d Cong. (1913).
172. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133; see also EISENBACH
ET AL., supra note 57, at 3.
173. Bank Holding Company Act § 5.
174. Id. § 5(b).
175. See supra Part I.A.2.
176. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, § 39(a), 64 Stat. 882 (1950) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1)
177. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., Supervising and Regulating Financial
Institutions and Activities, supra note 154, at 74; see also Federal Institutions Supervisory and
Insurance Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028, 1029 (giving the Board, for the first time,
legal authority to pre-emptively take action against banks “about to engage . . . in an unsafe or
unsound practice”); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102242, § 121, 105 Stat. 2250 (outlining how federal regulators, including the Board, must take
“prompt corrective action” should bank capital positions deteriorate); EUR. CENT. BANK, supra note
133, at 20; Lev Menand, Too Big to Supervise: The Rise of Financial Conglomerates and the Decline
of Discretionary Oversight in Banking, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1527, 1542, 1557 (2018).
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To fulfill these safety-and-soundness mandates, the Fed routinely
examines these financial institutions to assess their condition along a
number of pertinent dimensions. 178 (Notably, Reserve Banks perform
the bulk of day-to-day supervision, acting on authority delegated from
the Board. 179) The Gramm-Leach-Bliley (“GLB”) Act provides specific
parameters to guide the exams. As paraphrased by the Federal Reserve,
GLB suggests inspections should be conducted to
Inform the board of the nature of the operations and financial condition of each BHC and
its subsidiaries, including—
[T]he financial and operational risks within the holding company system that may pose a
threat to the safety and soundness of any depository institution (DI) subsidiary of such
bank holding company, and
[T]he systems for monitoring and controlling such financial and operational risks; and
[M]onitor compliance by any entity with the provisions of the BHC Act or any other federal
law that the Board has specific jurisdiction to enforce against the entity, and to monitor
compliance with any provisions of federal law governing transactions and relationships
between any DI subsidiary of a BHC and its affiliates. 180

The Fed’s supervisory staff has authority under the BHC Act to “review
all books and records of a banking organization” under its purview. 181
The Fed Board has interpreted these statutory “safety and
soundness” mandates, and the powers they afford, and set out guidance
for on-the-ground examiners in published supervisory manuals.
According to these documents, supervisors must evaluate bank holding
companies rigorously surrounding their loan administration. They
must, for example, consider the bank’s lending standards and practices
(including credit policies and processes for assessing borrower’s
financial capacity). Supervisors are also told to evaluate a bank’s risk
management framework generally and the way in which it undertakes
credit analysis. Along these lines, there are a number of “inspection
objectives” the manual sets out, including, for example:
To determine if the parent’s loan policies are adequate in relation to the responsibilities
it has for the supervision of its credit-extending subsidiaries and whether those policies
are consistent with safe and sound lending practices. . . .

178. See DIV. OF SUPERVISION & REGUL., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., BANK
HOLDING
COMPANY
SUPERVISION
MANUAL
(Feb.
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/supervision_bhc.htm [https://perma.cc/T92D-UBQV]
[hereinafter BHC SUPERVISION MANUAL]. The BHC Supervision Manual is voluminous.
RSRV.
BANK
OF
N.Y.,
179. Supervision,
FED.
https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/org_banksup.html (last visited July 18, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/YR55-69B3] (noting that while the Board establishes supervisory policies, it
delegates day-to-day supervision to the Reserve Banks).
180. BHC SUPERVISION MANUAL, supra note 178, § 1040.0.
181. Id. § 1040.0.1.1.
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To establish whether the loan policy ensures sound assessments of the value of real estate
and other collateral. 182

For commercial loans specifically, supervisors are instructed
To determine whether the bank holding company has formal credit policies that (1)
provide clear guidance on its appetite for credit risk and (2) support sound lending
decisions. . . .
To be alert to indications of insufficiently rigorous risk assessment at banking
organizations, particularly inadequate stress testing and excessive reliance on strong
economic conditions and robust financial markets to support a borrower’s capacity to
service its debts.
To be attentive in reviewing a banking organization’s assessment and monitoring of credit
risk to ensure that undue reliance on favorable conditions does not lead to delayed
recognition of emerging weaknesses in some loans. 183

As such, bank supervisors expect that bank managers are considering
“all relevant risk[s]” in their underwriting practices. 184
Credit risk is not the only risk that supervisors mind.
Supervisors are instructed to assess the BHCs along the “entire
spectrum of risks facing an institution,” including “operational risk,
which arises from the potential that inadequate information systems,
operational problems, . . . or unforeseen catastrophes will result in
unexpected losses.” 185 The spectrum also necessarily includes “market
risk,” which is described as “the risk to an institution’s financial
condition resulting from adverse movements in market rates
or prices . . . .” 186
Additionally, Fed supervisors have scope where the largest
financial institutions are concerned. 187 Since 2015, the Fed has
employed a special supervisory system for this category of BHCs with

182. Id. § 2010.2.8 (“Inspection Objectives”).
183. Id.
184. DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REGUL., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
SR 96-36, GUIDANCE ON EVALUATING ACTIVITIES UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF U.S. BRANCH,
AGENCIES AND NONBANK SUBSIDIARIES OF FOREIGN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (FBOS) (Dec. 19,
1996); see also 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-1 (“Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for
Safety and Soundness”); Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 62 Fed. Reg. 752 (Jan. 6,
1997).
185. BHC SUPERVISION MANUAL, supra note 178, § 2124.01.6 (“Assessing the Institution’s
Risk”).
186. Id.
187. “Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (LISCC) firms: the largest, most
complex U.S. and foreign financial organizations subject to consolidated supervision by the Federal
Reserve. Nonbank financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) for supervision by the Federal Reserve are included in the LISCC portfolio. LISCC firms
are considered to pose the greatest systemic risk to the U.S. economy.” DIV. OF BANKING
SUPERVISION & REGUL., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., SR 12-17, CONSOLIDATED
SUPERVISION FRAMEWORK FOR LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Dec. 17, 2012).
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over $100 billion in assets. 188 This set of large financial institutions
(“LFIs”) includes Bank of America, BNY Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman
Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells
Fargo. 189 From November 2018, these LFIs have been subject to a
specific rating system adopted to determine, via supervisory
evaluations, whether the institution “possesses sufficient financial and
operational strength and resilience to maintain safe-and-sound
operations through a range of conditions, including stressful ones.” 190
The LFI rating system comprises three components: capital planning
and positions; liquidity risk management and positions; and governance
and controls. 191
Supervisors thus have a good deal of lawful discretion in risk
assessment. 192 In theory, supervisors have latitude to consider whether
banks are adequately considering all manner of credit risk—including
climate risk. And Supervisors have similar latitude to decide what
consequences follow from a deficiency they identify. Most penalties take
the shape of informal actions, “in the sense that the Federal Reserve’s
authority to impose these actions is based on supervisory practice as
described in various SR Letters.” 193 These are referred to as letters,
dubbed “matters requiring attention,” or “MRAs”; or with slightly more
seriousness, “matters requiring immediate attention,” or “MRIAs.” As
their names suggest, these letters pinpoint issues that are important to
the Fed and which the Fed expects the bank to address. 194
But the discretion for such supervisory enforcement actions
related to banks’ exposure to climate assets is, in practice, narrower. In
particular, the Fed’s interpretive guidance on the use of MRAs would
seem to preclude these letters from applying to situations of banks’
climate risk exposure. MRAs (and MRIAs) must be related to “matters
that have the potential to pose significant risks to the safety and
soundness of the banking organization” or matters that violate the

188. DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION & REGUL., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
SR 15-7, GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE LARGE INSTITUTION SUPERVISION COORDINATING
COMMITTEE (LISCC) SUPERVISORY PROGRAM (Apr. 17, 2015).
189. Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/large-institution-supervision.htm (last
updated Dec. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/D745-N5LT].
190. BHC SUPERVISION MANUAL, supra note 178, § 1060.1. The terms “financial strength and
resilience” and “operational strength and resilience” are defined in footnote three of section
1060.01 of the BHC Supervision Manual, id.
191. Id.
192. 12 C.F.R. § 337 (2021) (outlining the FDIC’s authority to assess “unsafe and unsound
banking practices”).
193. EISENBACH ET AL., supra note 57, at 29–30.
194. Id.
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law. 195 As Fed Vice Chair for Supervision Randall Quarles has
described them,
MRAs are supervisory communications that identify areas where banks are out of
compliance with applicable legal standards or otherwise are engaged in practices that
create substantial safety and soundness risks. MRAs identify the source of the compliance
failure, deficiency, or safety and soundness weakness and generally include an expected
timeframe for remediation. MRAs are not legally binding and are not enforcement
actions. 196

That standard is likely to become much stricter. As Quarles proposed
in January 2020, MRAs may soon be limited to “violations of law,
violations of regulation, and material safety and soundness issues.” 197
For the reasons set out in Part I, banks’ exposure to physical and
transition risks does not presently appear to implicate “material safety
and soundness issues.” 198
There are also formal actions—like cease and desist orders—
that the Fed could use to discipline banks on climate. 199 But standards
for applying those are higher than those for MRAs or MRIAs. Formal
enforcement actions are publicly disclosed documents that must
stipulate verifiable facts about a firm; generally, these actions address
demonstrable violations of banking law or regulation. 200 Accordingly,
absent future legislative or regulatory prohibitions on banks from
investing in certain climate-unfriendly assets, formal enforcement
actions from the Fed seem inapposite.
ii. Macroprudential Supervision
As earlier discussed, the Fed also has responsibility to supervise
the banking system as a whole in the interest of financial stability. 201
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 “explicitly direct[ed] the Federal Reserve
195. Id. at 30.
196. Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Speech at the American Bar Association Banking Law Committee Meeting 2020: Transparency,
Accountability,
and
Fairness
in
Bank
Supervision
(Jan.
17,
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/quarles20200117a.htm
[https://perma.cc/N33M-WFP2].
197. Id.; see also Supervisory Policy and Guidance Topics, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RSRV. SYS. https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/enforcement.htm (last updated
Feb. 23, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HNV6-6KDU].
198. See supra notes 72–90.
199. See, e.g., Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Cease and Desist Order
in
the
Matter
of
Agricultural
Bank
of
China
(Sept.
28,
2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20160929a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G838-WTXY].
200. Enforcement Actions & Legal Developments, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/legal-developments.htm (last visited June 6, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/NAQ9-8XGL].
201. See supra Part II.A.4.
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to routinely factor macroprudential considerations into its supervisory
and regulatory activities.” 202 In particular, the Dodd-Frank Act
mandated a new form of supervision, which was designed to probe the
resilience of the financial system overall.
The innovation is known as supervisory stress testing. The aim
of the supervisory stress test centers around capital and capital
planning. As explained in the Fed’s first paper setting out its process
and rationale for supervisory stress testing, “a large BHC’s processes
for managing and allocating its capital resources are critical not only to
its individual health and performance, but also to the stability and
effective functioning of the U.S. financial system.” 203
Stress testing is a scenario-based exercise which is conducted
every year on large banks with over $100 billion in consolidated assets
(and every other year for medium-size BHCs). 204 The tests require
banks to provide information about their balance sheets in response to
a set of scenarios involving some kind of unexpected, drastic economic
shock. 205 Scenarios on the test vary year to year. In 2018, for example,
the Board applied a severely adverse scenario “characterized by a
severe global recession in which the U.S. unemployment rate rises
almost 6 percentage points to 10 percent, accompanied by a steepening
Treasury yield curve.” 206
Each scenario includes 28 variables--such as gross domestic product, unemployment rate,
stock market prices, and interest rates--encompassing domestic and international
economic activity. Along with the variables, the Board is publishing a narrative that
describes the general economic conditions in the scenarios and changes in the scenarios
from the previous year. 207

In 2020, the “severely adverse scenario . . . feature[d] a severe
global recession in which the U.S. unemployment rate rises by 6.5
percentage points to 10 percent, and elevated stress in corporate debt
202. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., Supervising and Regulating Financial
Institutions and Activities, supra note 154, at 98.
203. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., CAPITAL PLANNING AT LARGE BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES: SUPERVISORY EXPECTATIONS AND RANGE OF CURRENT PRACTICE 1 (Aug. 2013),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20130819a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WW2W89T6].
204. Firms with over $250 billion consolidated assets have to take the test every year. See BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2020: SUPERVISORY STRESS
TEST RESULTS 1 (June 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2020-dfast-results20200625.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK5R-9ASD].
205. For methodology, see id.
206. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Releases
Scenarios for 2018 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and Dodd-Frank Act
Stress Test Exercises and Issues Instructions to Firms Participating in CCAR (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20180201a.htm
[https://perma.cc/QN7B-9859].
207. Id.
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markets and commercial real estate.” 208 Banks with large trading
operations were also “required to factor in a global market shock
component as part of their scenarios.” 209 The aim of the 2020 scenarios
was to give the Fed an idea of “how large banks perform during a severe
recession” and to give the Board “increased information on how
leveraged loans and collateralized loan obligations may respond to
a recession.” 210
The Fed then uses its own models 211 to determine the effect of
the shock on the regulatory capital ratios of the firms; importantly,
stress testing assumes a dynamic balance sheet—that is, it models the
impact of a shock on banks’ balance sheets over a nine quarter time
horizon. 212 With those projections, the Fed gets a picture (more like a
short film) of how each institution in the banking system would react to
the economic shock. 213 In addition to the scenario responses, some
BHCs also submit a capital plan to the Fed, describing their capital
planning processes and governance and a capital plan describing their
decisions about dividend distributions. 214 If a bank “fails” its stress test,
it may not make capital distributions (pay dividends) unless and until
the Fed approves. 215
The legal authority for the stress tests is two-fold. Formally, the
Fed runs two simultaneous stress tests. One of those, known as the
DFAST, is required by section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act. That
provision mandates that
208. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Releases
Hypothetical Scenarios for Its 2020 Stress Test Exercises (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200206a.htm
[https://perma.cc/NEE7-TALP].
209. Id.
210. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Model independence is critical to the credibility of the test. As the Fed noted in its policy
statement on supervisory stress testing, “Supervisory models provide an independent check on
firm risk management, and the use of consistent supervisory models in both the DFAST
assessment and CCAR quantitative assessments is critical to ensuring that resulting capital
requirements are based on a comparable assessment.” Stress Testing Policy Statement, 84 Fed.
Reg. 6664, 6665 (Feb. 28, 2019).
212. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 204, at 11.
213. Stress tests also have some salutary value. The results of stress tests are released to the
public. Id. at ix. When banks pass, they reassure the market; this can be especially valuable during
times of economic uncertainty or recent crisis. Even in benign market conditions, the information
released from the Fed stress tests is believed to prompt markets to react. See MARK FLANNERY,
BEVERLY HIRTLE & ANNA KOVNER, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 744, EVALUATING
THE INFORMATION IN THE FEDERAL RESERVE STRESS TESTS 26 (rev. Aug. 2016),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr744.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5GR6-2AF8] (finding that “stress testing disclosures continue to inform the
market, with statistically significant abnormal volumes and returns”).
214. FLANNERY ET AL., supra note 213, at 6.
215. Id.
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The Board of Governors, in coordination with the appropriate primary financial
regulatory agencies . . . shall conduct annual analyses in which nonbank financial
companies supervised by the Board of Governors and bank holding companies . . . are
subject to evaluation of whether such companies have the capital, on a total consolidated
basis, necessary to absorb losses as a result of adverse economic conditions. 216

That provision further provides that the Board “may develop and apply
such other analytic techniques as are necessary to identify, measure,
and monitor risks to the financial stability of the United States.” 217
Meanwhile, the second stress test—the Comprehensive Capital
Analysis and Review (“CCAR”)—was developed by the Fed as adjunct
to its capital planning rule, which it promulgates pursuant to the Bank
Holding Company Act. 218 The Capital Plan Rule “requires all U.S.domiciled, top-tier BHCs with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or
more to develop and maintain a capital plan supported by a robust
process for assessing their capital adequacy.” 219 CCAR is used to
evaluate the “plans of all BHCs subject to the Capital Plan Rule . . . in
a single, unified process.” 220
Accordingly, with stress testing, the Fed could lawfully
incorporate climate change in some ways, but not others. Climaterelated scenarios appear to be fair game. The Fed has the regulatory
latitude to develop the stress test scenarios each year, with input from
experts in economic fields. 221 The parameters are as follows:
In general, the baseline scenario will reflect the most recently available consensus views
of the macroeconomic outlook expressed by professional forecasters, government agencies,
and other public-sector organizations as of the beginning of the stress-test cycle. The
severely adverse scenario will consist of a set of economic and financial conditions that
reflect the conditions of post-war U.S. recessions. 222

There are no other legal or regulatory restrictions that would
prevent the Fed from devising a scenario that featured climate change,

216. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 165, 124 Stat. 1376, 1430 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
217. Id.
218. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 203, at 1.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1 n.3. The DFAST and the CCAR are run simultaneously, pursuant to the same
macroeconomic scenarios, and with the same inputs provided by the banks. The main difference
between the two regards their assumptions—CCAR models bank balance sheets based on what
the bank has said they plan to do in their capital plan regarding dividend, share repurchase, and
other capital actions; meanwhile, DFAST assumes a standard plan for all banks in those regards.
221. As discussed, for the scenario to actually dent bank balance sheets it would have to be
analogous to a recession or “retrenchment in housing prices.” Bora Durdu, Rochelle Edge & Daniel
Schwindt, Measuring the Severity of Stress-Test Scenarios, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV.
SYS. (May 5, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/measuring-theseverity-of-stress-test-scenarios-20170505.htm
[https://perma.cc/99HU-SNPW].
For
rules
regarding how the Fed designs its scenarios, see 12 C.F.R. § 252, app. A (2021).
222. 12 C.F.R. § 252, app. A § 4(b) (2021).
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provided it were designed to meet the above-mentioned requirements
for severity. 223
There are, however, legal limits to the lines along which the Fed
can evaluate the banks during the stress test. Both the DFAST and
CCAR are statutorily linked to capital and the capital planning process.
So while the Fed could hypothesize a recession precipitated by climate
change, its evaluations would necessarily focus on the extent to which
bank balance sheets have capacity to remain resilient over some period
of time during a recession-type scenario.
The Fed could not use stress testing as a way to scrutinize the
nature of bank lending, divorced from concrete risk. This limit could
make it difficult to capture concerns that are predicted along a much
longer time horizon. For example, CCAR and DFAST stress testing
cannot, as designed, address the more gradual risks envisioned with
climate change. Those tests do not allow the Fed to probe banks’ capital
position in reaction to more gradual macroeconomic events—like rising
sea levels or phased-in transition policies. Nor could stress tests be
lawfully used as tools for supervisors to pass value judgments on the
kinds of loans and other credit investments BHCs are making. 224
In recognition of these limits inherent in traditional stress tests,
the Bank of England (“the BOE”) consulted on a proposal to develop a
new stress test that considers climate risks. In 2019, the BOE asked for
public input on a new biennial exploratory scenario (“BES”) “to explore
the financial risks posed by climate change.” 225 “The BES is the part of
the Bank’s stress testing framework used to explore less wellunderstood risks that are not neatly linked to the financial cycle.” 226
The stated objectives of the BES are different from those of the BOE’s
standard, capital-focused stress test. In particular, the BES will

223. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Remarks at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Risk Conference: Developing Tools for Dynamic Capital
Supervision
(Apr.
10,
2012),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/tarullo20120410a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EC7L-WY5X].
224. As described in an early paper on stress testing, “quantitative metrics have a role to play
in this view of supervision, but examiners are not directed to come to an independent view of a
firm’s creditworthiness in a stress scenario.” BEVERLY HIRTLE & ANDREAS LEHNERT, FED. RSRV.
BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 696, SUPERVISORY STRESS TESTS 3 (Nov. 2014),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr696.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MG43-QCNE].
225. The 2021 Biennial Exploratory Scenario on the Financial Risks from Climate Change,
BANK OF ENG. 1 (Dec. 2019), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/paper/2019/the2021-biennial-exploratory-scenario-on-the-financial-risks-from-climate-change.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5EBH-CVSE].
226. Id.
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focus on sizing risks, rather than testing firms’ capital adequacy or setting capital
requirements. It will also allow the Bank to examine how major financial firms expect to
adjust their business models, and what the collective impact of these responses on the
wider economy might be. Finally, the BES will provide a vehicle for financial firms to
identify and address data gaps and to develop cutting-edge risk management
approaches. 227

This addition to the BOE’s stress testing framework is well
justified under its expansive and explicit statutory objectives for
financial stability. The Banking Act 2009 states as one of the Bank’s
primary objectives “to protect and enhance the stability of the financial
system of the United Kingdom.” 228 Additionally, the Bank of England
Act 1998, as amended by the Financial Services Act 2012, added a
financial stability strategy to be pursued by the Bank’s Court of
Directors: it shall “determine the Bank’s strategy in relation to the
Financial Stability Objective.” 229 Critically, Parliament intended for
that strategy to be dynamic, providing that the BOE Court should “from
time to time review, and if necessary revise, the strategy.” 230
Thirdly, the Financial Services Act also created the Financial
Policy Committee (“FPC”) within the BOE. The FPC is a body charged
primarily with the “identification of, monitoring for, and taking action
to remove or reduce, systemic risks with a view to protecting and
enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system.” 231 The FPC has
statutory power to introduce regulations and guidelines to meet that
mandate—and this is the flexible power it uses to recommend and
design new changes for BOE stress tests. 232 It also has a secondary
objective to support the UK government’s economic policy, and so would
have a role to play “in seeking to support the government’s Green
Finance Strategy, which aims to ensure that the financial system is able

227. Id. The Dutch Central Bank is exploring something similar. See ROBERT VERMEULEN,
EDO SCHETS, MELANIE LOHUIS, BARBARA KÖLBL, DAVID-JAN JANSEN & WILLEM HEERINGA, DE
NEDERLANDSCHE BANK N.V., AN ENERGY TRANSITION RISK STRESS TEST FOR THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM OF THE NETHERLANDS, 16-7 OCCASIONAL STUD. (2018) (studying the effect of a carbon tax
on bank borrowers and bank balance sheets). The ECB is as well. See Luis de Guindos, Shining a
Light on Climate Risks: The ECB’s Economy-Wide Climate Stress Test, EUR. CENT. BANK: THE ECB
BLOG
(Mar.
18,
2021),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2021/html/ecb.blog210318~3bbc68ffc5.en.html
[https://perma.cc/N3LW-ES8Z] (“The ECB climate stress test examines the resilience of companies
and banks to a range of climate scenarios.”).
228. Banking Act 2009, c. 1, pt. 1, § 4(4) (UK).
229. Bank of England Act 1998, c. 11, pt. 1A, § 9A(1)(a) (UK).
230. Id. § 9A(1)(b).
231. Id. § 9C(2).
232. Id. § 9H(1).
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to act to facilitate finance to support the delivery of the UK’s carbon
targets and clean growth.” 233
The Fed’s legal authority to pursue financial stability objectives
is a different shade altogether. As a matter of explicit text, the Fed’s
“financial stability” mandate is weaker than the BOE’s. 234 The Fed’s
authority over financial stability is somewhat implicit, conferred by
virtue of its historic role as lender of last resort under section 10B of the
Federal Reserve Act. 235 And it has consolidated that position via its
power under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act to supervise and regulate
systemically important financial institutions and nonbank financial
institutions on a special basis. 236 But Congress has not legislated for the
Fed a broad-based financial stability objective, nor given it a general
rulemaking power to pursue any range of financial stability aims like
the UK Parliament did with the BOE. Tellingly, Congress chose to put
the United States’ analog to the FPC—the Financial Stability Oversight
Council—under the Treasury’s aegis, further confirming that
lawmakers intended for the government, not the Fed, to be responsible
for creating new financial stability-serving tools. 237
B. Reserve Bank Powers
The twelve regional Reserve Banks—spread across the nation—
are a unique fixture in the U.S. central banking system. This
decentralized nature of the Fed System was the result of a Wilsonian
compromise, struck as a grand bargain necessary to achieve the passage
of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. 238 The compromise was designed by
233. Letter from Rishi Sunak, HM Treasury, to Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England,
Remit and Recommendations for the Financial Policy Committee (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/letter/2020/chancellor-letter-11032020-fpc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BGC-Q5QF] (suggesting the FPC has a role to play in regard to the
consideration of climate risk).
234. Interestingly, the ECB does not have an explicit financial stability mandate. Yves
Mersch, Member, Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. Bank, Speech at the ESCB Legal Conference:
Financial
Stability
and
the
ECB
(Sept.
6,
2018),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180906.en.html
[https://perma.cc/3GS6-JXE9].
235. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
236. Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Fed to establish prudential standards for
nonbank financial institutions and BHCs with at least $250 billion in assets that are “more
stringent than the standards and requirements” applicable to other institutions. Dodd-Frank Act
§ 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)(1).
237. See 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1)(A) (making the Secretary of the Treasury the chairperson of
the Financial Stability Oversight Council).
238. See generally Structure of the Federal Reserve System, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/structure-federal-reserve-system.htm
(last updated Mar. 3, 2017) [https://perma.cc/W5EX-QRET] (overviewing the Fed’s decentralized
nature and philosophy).
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those, like Virginia Representative Carter Glass, who were wary of
concentrating too much government power over the nation’s money in
Wall Street or Washington (a view reminiscent of the popular antipathy
toward the First and Second Banks of the United States in the mid- and
late-nineteenth century). 239
Apropos of that compromise, the Reserve Banks have both public
and private elements. Structurally, the Reserve Banks are hybrid. The
Federal Reserve Act stipulates that each of the Reserve Banks be
organized and capitalized like a private banking corporation—the
private banks in the district are its stockholders, and each Reserve
Bank is run by a board of directors that “shall perform the duties
usually appertaining to the office of directors of banking associations
and all such duties as are prescribed by law.” 240 The Federal Reserve
Act also authorizes the Reserve Banks to establish their own bylaws, as
most other corporations do. 241
The Reserve Banks’ role (and image), meanwhile, is largely
public. In legislative discussions of the Reserve Banks’ role during the
1913 founding of the Fed, Congress was clear that
these great public utility banks are not intended to be merely money-making banks, but
that they are guardians of the public welfare, primarily safeguarding the member banks,
protecting their reserves, safeguarding their credit, protecting them from panic or
financial stringency, and being always prepared to furnish them with accommodation at
a reasonable rate of interest. 242

That sentiment is reflected in current text of the Federal Reserve Act
as well, which gives the Reserve Banks various powers to support the
Fed Board and FOMC in the conduct of monetary policy (and, as
noted, 243 the execution of day-to-day bank supervision). 244
239. See
Carter
Glass,
FED.
RSRV.
HIST.,
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/people/carter_glass (last visited May 30, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/G2TS-86Z5].
240. Federal Reserve Act § 4(7), 12 U.S.C. § 301; id. § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 222.
241. Id. § 4(4), 12 U.S.C. § 341.
242. ROBERT LATHAM OWEN, BANKING AND CURRENCY, S. REP. NO. 63-133, pt. 2, at 10 (1913).
243. See supra notes 179–180.
244. Regarding monetary policy, reserve banks are authorized and expected to extend loans
(and set the rate of discount) and other kinds of accommodation to the banks within their district.
Federal Reserve Act § 4(8). The Reserve Bank presidents also participate on the FOMC, and the
New York Fed is deputized to execute open-market operations to implement the FOMC’s monetary
policy. Federal Reserve Act § 12A, 12 U.S.C. § 263. The text of section 4(8) provides that the
Reserve Banks
may, subject to the provisions of law and the orders of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, extend to each member bank such discounts, advancements,
and accommodations as may be safely and reasonably made with due regard for the
claims and demands of other member banks, the maintenance of sound credit
conditions, and the accommodation of commerce, industry, and agriculture.
Id. § 4(8), 12 U.S.C. § 301.
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Perhaps the most significant monetary policy role the Reserve
Banks play is lending to depository institutions through the discount
window, under section 10B of the Federal Reserve Act, 245 and to
nonbank institutions in times of emergency, under section 13(3) of the
Act. 246 The Reserve Banks’ authority to provide liquidity to banks and
nonbank corporations (and individuals) is often referred to as the LOLR
role of the central bank. 247
Generally speaking, the Reserve Banks act as LOLRs for a
number of different reasons relating to exogenous macro shocks. As just
noted, the New York Fed implemented special, ad hoc liquidity facilities
for its primary dealers during the 2008 mortgage and 2020 COVID-19
crises. 248 The Fed also used its power under section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act to enable the New York Reserve Bank to extend standing
loan facilities to institutions that it does not directly oversee, given the
“unusual and exigent” circumstances of these crises, in creating the
245. Federal Reserve Act § 10B, 12 U.S.C. § 347b(a); see also Policy Tools: The Discount
Window and Discount Rate, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm (last updated May 25, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/4KMR-UCJG] (“[T]he discount window supports the smooth flow of credit to
households and businesses.”). Managing the discount window is a joint effort between the Board
and the reserve banks—these loans are billed as monetary policy tools but are extended by the
regional Reserve Banks (usually, the New York Fed). The Board has the legal authority to
determine whether a bank’s offered collateral is acceptable, but the Reserve Bank sets the discount
rate on loans offered through its lending facilities, subject to review by the Board. See Federal
Reserve Act § 13(2), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (establishing that the Board shall create policies and
procedures requiring reserve banks to assign a lendable value to all collateral); id. § 14(2)(d), 12
U.S.C. § 357 (granting reserve banks the authority to set discount rates on loans). The Board also
has to agree by affirmative vote to the extension of the discount window to nonbank companies in
“unusual and exigent circumstances.” Id. § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A); see also Press Release, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Discount and Advance Rates (May 18, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200707a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3LZU-ZE46].
246. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3).
247. While 10B loans are not only, technically, for emergencies, banks generally only approach
the Fed for access to the discount window if they are experiencing temporary liquidity problems
for reasons related to a market panic and have sufficiently valuable collateral to offer as security
for the loan. This is referred to as “Bagehot’s dictum.” See Ben S. Bernanke, Fed Emergency
Lending, BROOKINGS (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2015/12/03/fedemergency-lending/ [https://perma.cc/8XMG-S776] (discussing robust LOLR capabilities to ward
off financial crises); Brian F. Madigan, Dir., Div. of Monetary Affs., Speech at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium: Formulating and Implementing Policies to
Combat
the
Financial
Crisis
(Aug.
21,
2009),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/madigan20090821a.htm
[https://perma.cc/4A98-ESN6] (discussing how Bagehot’s dictum underlays various emergency
lending programs launched during Global Financial Crisis).
248. Term Sheet for Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RSRV.
SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200317b1.pdf
(last
visited May 30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/3BJY-TENK]; Primary Dealer Credit Facility, FED. RSRV.
BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primary-dealer-credit-facility (last visited
May 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/EY57-87PP].

1350

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:5:1301

facility known as “TALF.” 249 The Board also created facilities for money
markets, commercial paper markets, and municipalities as well—most
of which the New York Reserve Bank orchestrated. 250
In regard to the Board’s decisions to create a LOLR-style facility,
the Fed is agnostic to the reason behind the market turmoil. Whereas
in 2008 the shock resulted from an asset bubble bursting, in 2020, the
Fed faced off against a global health pandemic. So indeed, there would
be little question of the Fed’s legal authority to extend (or possibly
create new) emergency facilities should any sudden climate shock—like
a series of catastrophic storms—send the market into free fall.
But there are also a number of different ways that the Reserve
Banks could use their specific LOLR powers in sections 10B and 13(3)
offensively, to make the financial system greener. The Reserve Banks
have considerable discretion regarding the collateral they deem
acceptable in exchange for LOLR loan assistance. Indeed, both sections
10B and 13(3) merely require that the loans be “secured to the
satisfaction” of Federal Reserve banks. 251 In theory, then, this gives the
Reserve banks considerable latitude to condition LOLR assistance on a
249. “TALF is a credit facility . . . intended to help meet the credit needs of consumers and
businesses by facilitating the issuance of asset-backed securities (“ABS”) and improving the
market conditions for ABS more generally.” Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, BD. OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/monetary20200723a2.pdf (last visited July
19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/UF69-RWBB]. It serves as a funding backstop to facilitate ABS
issuance. Id.
250. In 2020, the Fed also used its § 13(3) powers to create a commercial paper funding facility.
Commercial Paper Funding Facility 2020: Program Terms and Conditions, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200317a1.pdf
(last
visited May 30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8PD5-88KA]; Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity
Facility,
BD.
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200318a1.pdf
(last
visited May 30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/65RR-FUJL]; Regulatory Capital Rule: Money Market
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, 85 Fed. Reg. 16232, 16234 (Mar. 23, 2020). This facility, operated
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, is making loans to eligible borrowers (like banks) and
accepts as collateral assets purchased from money market mutual funds (including Treasuries,
GSE securities, and certain types of commercial paper). Municipal Liquidity Facility, BD. OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200409a3.pdf
(last
visited May 30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8CRP-WS5E]; see also Heather Hennerich, The Fed’s
Emergency Lending Powers Explained, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS: OPEN VAULT BLOG (March
31,
2021),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2021/march/fed-emergency-lending-powersexplained [https://perma.cc/7LDC-R7A8].
251. Federal Reserve Act § 10B, 12 U.S.C. § 347b; id. § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343. In similar
fashion, the Reserve Banks have some discretion in regard to the conduct of open-market
operations; § 14(2)(b), for instance, gives them authority to buy municipal debt and discretion to
choose which localities’ bonds to buy. Id. § 14(2)(b), 12 U.S.C. § 355. One could also see how openmarket operations could be conducted in a way to favor those municipalities committed to green
policies. That would directly channel dollars to certain geographies, rewarding them for green
behavior.
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particular kind of collateral—deciding, for example, only green
collateral would be eligible for rediscount for 13(3) assistance. 252 Doing
so would, of course, all but require banks—and a large swath of
nonbank financial institutions—to load up on green collateral and
possibly offload some brown assets.
Historically, similar experiments were not successful. At various
points in the 1920s, Reserve Banks experimented with the “use [of]
discount policy” to “selectively curb the use of bank credit for certain
purposes” or “as a means of influencing final use of bank credit.” 253
First, in 1920, the Board leaned on the Reserve Banks to directly
pressure banks to stop or reduce lending for speculation through
discount policy. 254 “According to this view, Reserve Bank officials
should keep informed on member bank lending and investing policies
and deny access to the discount window to those extending credit for
speculative and other nonessential uses.” 255 While Reserve Bank
officials tried for a time, the practice was soon abandoned: “There was
considerable sentiment that it was impractical to try to distinguish
between essential and nonessential uses of bank credit in peacetime.” 256
Interest in Reserve Bank measures to “influence allocation of member
bank credit” reemerged later in the decade. 257
In 1928, voices within and outside the system suggested the use
of penalty rates again to deter banks from lending for speculative
purposes, and/or preferential rates to sustain or encourage lending for
commerce and agriculture. 258 The idea was proposed, but rejected, by
the Reserve Bank Governors in the Open Market Investment
Committee (“OMIC”). 259 One academic, Professor O.N.W. Sprague,
suggested a legislative fix. In his words, the idea would be to include “a
simple provision to the Federal Reserve act, authorizing, or perhaps
252. There are variations on this policy theme. The Fed could also provide a more favorable
discount rate for green collateral. Or, going a U.K. route, the Fed could require firms to pre-position
collateral—that is, provide evidence of certain kinds of collateral on the balance sheet to ensure a
smooth transition if and when access to the discount window arises. See BANK OF ENG., LOAN
COLLATERAL: GUIDANCE FOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE STERLING MONETARY FRAMEWORK 6 (2020),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/markets/eligible-collateral/loanprepositioning-guide [https://perma.cc/5E54-MKV3].
253. CLAY J. ANDERSON, FED. RSRV. BANK OF PHILA., FUNDAMENTAL REAPPRAISAL OF THE
DISCOUNT MECHANISM: EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE DISCOUNT MECHANISM
4,
10,
31
(Nov.
1966),
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/federal%20reserve%20history/discountmech/evolr
ole_ander.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX6S-X5WG] (internal quotation marks omitted).
254. Id. at 25.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 26.
257. Id. at 27.
258. Id. at 24.
259. Id.
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directing, the Reserve banks to impose a rate 1 per cent higher than the
call renewal rate upon rediscounts for member banks that are lending
on the Exchange at the time the accommodation is secured.” 260 But
“[s]erious objections” followed on the ground that “it would be difficult
to implement such discretionary power wisely. . . . It would not be easy
to determine when securities loans were excessive.” 261
Other objections to “trying to use administration of the discount
window as a tool of selective bank credit control” generally focused on
the fact that such action could not prevent other financial institutions
from making such loans and that the “Federal Reserve Act does not give
either the Federal Reserve Board or a Reserve Bank control over the
loan policy of a member bank” and “cannot compel a member bank to
make a loan which it does not desire to make nor restrain a member
bank from making a loan which it wishes to make.” 262
In regard to section 13(3), politicization of nonbank emergency
lending has likewise been unpopular. Between the 1970s and 2008, the
Reserve Banks had, on multiple occasions, lent selectively through
13(3) on what appeared to be a winner-take-all basis. Whether it was
contemplating an indirect rescue of New York City in 1975, or the Penn
Central Corporation in 1970, each incident appeared to violate the
convention that 13(3) lending should be limited to solvent but illiquid
companies or individuals—instead, it looked more like politically
pressured patronage. 263 Finally, the apparently selective nonbank
bailouts of 2008 prompted Congress to revise section 13(3) to avoid such
discretionary lending in the future. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 made
it impossible for the Reserve Banks to use 13(3) selectively—going
forward, the Reserve Banks would only be able to extend 13(3) facilities
that have “broad-based eligibility.” 264
Based on this history, it seems unlikely that either Congress or
the Fed Board would approve of a Reserve Bank collateral policy—or

260. Id.
261. Id. at 24–25.
262. Id. at 28–29.
263. See Charles W. Calomiris, Is the Discount Window Necessary? A Penn Central Perspective,
76 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 37–38 (1994) (detailing the Nixon Administration’s
attempts to force a bailout to save Penn Central); Anna J. Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed’s
Discount Window, 74 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 58, 62–65 (1992) (“Discount window
accommodation to insolvent institutions, whether banks or nonbanks, misallocates resources.
Political decisions substitute for market decisions.”).
264. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Approves
Final Rule Specifying Its Procedures for Emergency Lending Under Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve
Act
(Nov.
30,
2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20151130a.htm
[https://perma.cc/NK99-BNUL].
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other selective use of its power under section 10B or 13(3)—that is
designed to motivate banks to be greener (or less brown).
III. ASSESSING FED ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Until this point, the Article has considered the policy and legal
bases for various forms of Fed intervention regarding climate change.
The balance of the Article turns to the normative question of whether,
where possible, the Fed should exercise discretion or restraint in
pushing its existing legal boundaries. Part III.A sets out some
normative criteria for answering this question. Part III.B concludes
with some preliminary suggestions as to where the Fed could exercise
discretion without damage to these norms.
A. Discretion or Restraint
In weighing whether the Fed should seize upon discretion, or
exercise restraint, there are three factors to consider: the legitimacy of
the activity, which bears on Fed authority; the ability to maintain
credibility in implementing a new policy, which bears on Fed
effectiveness; and the impact on Fed independence from developing and
exercising expanded power.
1. Rule of Law
There are a few basic things that the Fed cannot legitimately do.
Most fundamentally, perhaps, the Fed may not exceed the limits of the
law as set out by Congress. 265 Among the institutional actors in the U.S.
government, the Fed has not been designated (by the legislature, the
federal courts, or the Executive) as an arbiter of which problems its
central banking tools should address. This is a sensible allocation of
power between the various branches of the government. After all, the
Fed is not directly accountable to the public in the way that Congress
and the President are. According to these principles, the Fed may not
legitimately substitute its judgment for that of Congress’s. 266 For these
reasons, the legitimacy question is a gating one. 267

265. This is a conception of legal legitimacy.
266. This notion of democratic legitimacy builds on the principle of legal legitimacy. For a full
treatment of the legitimacy of central banking power, see PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE
QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN CENTRAL BANKING AND THE REGULATORY STATE (2018).
267. Carola C. Binder & Christina Parajon Skinner, The Legitimacy of the Federal Reserve
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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To date, the U.S. Congress has not legislated a climate mandate
for the Fed, or adopted policies requiring that businesses abandon
carbon-rich activities. So it could very well be costly to democratic
values were the Fed to sidestep the legislative process with measures
to deter the banks that it oversees from lending to brown businesses or
households. Such action could be perceived as state action toward
picking winners and losers with regulation. 268
Thus, on one side of the legitimacy ledger are actions that have
very weak or no basis in the law: monetary policy that proactively seeks
green outcomes (like green QE); supervision used to deter lending to
certain classes of companies absent clear credit risk; and the use of
capital requirements to deter lending to certain sectors of the economy.
To make that kind of action legitimate, Congress would likely need to
expand the Fed’s mandate to explicitly direct it to pursue such
objectives. 269 That would empower the central bank vis-à-vis the
political branches and the fiscal authority vested in the Treasury. But
on the other side of the legitimacy ledger are those actions whereby the
Fed defensively reacts to potential problems posed by climate change:
the use of the LOLR power in response to climate-related shocks;
supervision of operational risk and asset quality measures; stress test
scenarios; and Reserve Bank research programs.
2. Technical Credibility
The second factor to consider is credibility. Former Fed Vice
Chairman Alan Blinder once remarked, “central bankers . . . take it as
axiomatic that their credibility affects the linkages from policy changes
(or policy pronouncements) to, say, long-term interest rates and
exchange rates.” 270 Also, the Fed must be credible in the eyes of the
banks it supervises in order to be effective as a supervisor and
regulator. 271 Because the efficacy of central banks’ pronouncements
268. Such firm-specific regulation is impermissible under British public law principles.
Indeed, this is arguably why the SIFI designation system of the FSOC largely failed. See Christina
Parajon Skinner, Regulating Nonbanks: A Plan for SIFI Lite, 105 GEO. L.J. 1379 (2017).
269. See Skinner, supra note 146.
270. Alan S. Blinder, Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It? 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7161, 1999), https://www.nber.org/papers/w7161.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C62B-34P3]; Ricketts, supra note 123 (“If the public trusts that the increase in
the monetary base QE creates is only temporary, then they will not expect rapid inflation in the
near future.”). See generally Lena Dräger, Michael J. Lamla & Damjan Pfajfar, The Hidden
Heterogeneity of Inflation Expectations and Its Implications (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv.
Sys., Working Paper No. 2020-054, 2020) (discussing how consumers form expectations about
inflation, which in turn impacts the transmission channel of monetary policy).
271. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Speech at the Allied
Social Science Association Annual Meeting: Central Banking and Bank Supervision in the United
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hinges on their credibility, if a policy cannot be undertaken credibly, it
should not be undertaken at all.
There are a few key things that keep the Fed’s credibility intact.
Evidence-based decisionmaking, for one, is critical. The Fed—like all
other technocratic bodies—is a fact-based decisionmaker. The public
expects and assumes that the Fed’s judgments about the economy are
guided by data, just as its judgments about the financial system must
be informed by sound models, metrics, and projections. If decisions
about economic forecasts or firms’ exposure to risk appear too
hypothetical or subjective, they may not be considered credible.
Credibility requires accuracy. Missteps and errors by the Fed can
undermine the public’s confidence in its ability to expertly manage
financial and economic crises.
As such, the transparency of the Fed’s decisionmaking is also
paramount. 272 Opacity may be perceived to shroud inaccuracy or a lack
of factual basis. This is precisely why transparency is especially critical
for credibility in areas where the Fed has significant discretion. 273 The
Fed has taken important strides toward transparent decisionmaking
over the past few decades. It now publishes a good deal of information
about its FOMC meetings and decisionmaking process, 274 its
methodology for evaluating firms during stress tests, and the bases for
adoption of formal rules. 275 But supervision, for instance, has lagged
behind, drawing criticism from legal and scholarly quarters. 276 For
these reasons, Fed Vice Chair for Supervision Randall Quarles has
States (Jan. 5, 2007), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070105a.htm
[https://perma.cc/4ND9-GR4L].
272. Quarles, supra note 196.
273. Peter Conti-Brown, The Curse of Confidential Supervisory Information, BROOKINGS (Dec.
20, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-curse-of-confidential-supervisory-information/
[https://perma.cc/27P5-DD44].
274. James Bullard, President’s Message: Recent Actions Increase the Fed’s Transparency, FED.
RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Apr. 1, 2012), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regionaleconomist/april-2012/recent-actions-increase-the-feds-transparency
[https://perma.cc/3QHHQR9K].
275. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2020:
SUPERVISORY
STRESS
TEST
METHODOLOGY
(Mar.
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2020-march-supervisory-stress-testmethodology.pdf. [https://perma.cc/Z25K-AL3H].
276. See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Yair Listokin & Nicholas R. Parrillo, Towards an
Administrative Law of Central Banking, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1 (2021); Guidance, Supervisory
Expectations, and the Rule of Law: How Do the Banking Agencies Regulate and Supervise
Institutions?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 116th Cong. (2019)
(statement of Margaret E. Tahyar, Partner, Davis Polk & Wardell LLP),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tahyar%20Testimony%204-30-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZM5R-M9KR] (“There has long been an uneasy truce between the transparency
and accountability required by the rule of law and the secrecy and discretion of [financial sector]
supervision. That uneasy truce has become untenable.”).
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recently pressed forward initiatives to increase transparency where
supervisory judgments are concerned. 277
Credibility could present challenges for the Fed where climate
risk is concerned. On the one hand, based on current information, it
would be difficult for the Fed to credibly increase regulation or take
supervisory enforcement actions concerning climate-related credit risk.
As Part I examined, the existing data do not appear to support a finding
that banks’ exposure to these assets present safety and soundness or
financial stability threats. 278 On the other hand, failing to acknowledge
climate risk at all could also damage Fed credibility. 279 The public could
become equally incredulous of the Fed’s commitment to anticipating
economic shocks should the Fed refuse to consider ways in which some
of its functions might be impacted by climate risk. The Fed’s willingness
to engage with leading academic and industry efforts to develop
methods of forecasting more difficult-to-capture risks—like shifts in
consumer preferences, migration patterns, and business formation 280—
appears key here. It would be important for the Fed to engage these
new methodologies in whatever path it might take. 281
Apart from the evidentiary issue, attempting to push banks
away from brown assets or toward green ones with supervisory or
regulatory incentives could have unintended consequences. Some of
them could be financial. Fed action along such lines could drive a
migration of financial activity outside of the banking sector and into
nonbanks. Increasing capital requirements surrounding brown assets
might not extinguish those investments; that lending activity could
shift to other areas of the financial system. 282 That happened following
the postcrisis increase in capital requirements that followed Basel III,
277. Pete Schroeder, Fed’s Quarles Vows More Transparency Around Stress Tests to Come,
REUTERS (July 9, 2019, 1:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-quarles/feds-quarlesvows-more-transparency-around-stress-tests-to-come-idUSKCN1U4288 [https://perma.cc/896RAAGQ].
278. See supra Part I.
279. As the 2019 NGFS report discusses, “[c]entral banks can reduce reputational risks by
acknowledging financial risks related to the transition towards a carbon-neutral economy and by
addressing these risks proactively in their own (risk) frameworks.” NGFS REPORT, supra note 2,
at 28.
280. For one such method, see VERMEULEN ET AL., supra note 227.
281. See supra notes 97, 108 and accompanying text (discussing the macroeconomic policy
decisionmaking in uncertainty). While a legal scholar may not be able to answer definitively the
economic question asked here, she can suggest what factual circumstances are necessary to trigger
legal authorities.
282. Though this may become increasingly unlikely as investors push asset managers toward
greener investments as well. See, e.g., Jennifer Thompson, Big Investors’ Sustainability Push
Drives
Demand
for
Environmental
Expertise,
FIN. TIMES
(Feb.
23,
2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/362fdc36-3b97-11ea-b84f-a62c46f39bc2
[https://perma.cc/5WWRUFH9].
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prompting considerable concern over the “shadow banking” sector. As a
result, the Fed now has less oversight over certain credit investments
as they move from bank to nonbank balance sheets.
Moreover, there is the question of sorting between green and
brown. In this regard, other questions arise. For one, as other
commentators have pointed out, “green” does not necessarily “mean
risk-free.” 283 Assets determined to be green at one point in time could
import other kinds of market or credit risk at a later one. By
incentivizing banks to increase their holdings of green investments, the
Fed could theoretically increase the riskiness of big bank balance sheets
along other dimensions. 284 In addition, ambiguity continues to exist
around the categories of activities and assets that should be deemed
green (or sustainable) versus brown. The lack of such standardization
may well prompt concern about the central bank’s expertise in
assessing assets along those dimensions—including, in the extreme,
accidental sponsorship of greenwashing. 285
Other unexpected consequences could be environmental. Many
so-called brown companies are highly incentivized to develop clean
energy innovations. 286 To the extent regulation requires banks to stop
or drastically reduce lending to certain companies (or creates incentives
with the same result), companies may well reduce or abandon the
financing of their green R&D. Inadvertently exacerbating climate risk
or financial instability in any of these ways could also be damaging to
the Fed’s credibility as an expert macroprudential regulator.
This all suggests that the credibility of the Fed’s actions depends
on the stance adopted: using existing policy tools to create a greener
financial system seems a difficult move to make on the basis of existing
information, but using supervisory tools to ensure that banks are
appropriately attentive to the changing nature of their credit risk might
strengthen its credibility as an agile central bank.

283. Sam Fleming & Jim Brunsden, Brussels Eyes Easing Bank Rules to Spur Green Lending,
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/bddc3850-1054-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a
[https://perma.cc/WT75-7SGQ].
284. “The real danger is that, by favoring green investments, central bankers will misallocate
capital or distort valuations. We saw what happened when central banks gave a low risk weight
to mortgage securities, which encouraged banks to pile into housing.” The Editorial Board, supra
note 23.
285. Id.; Stubbington & Arnold, supra note 137; see also NGFS INITIAL TAKEAWAYS, supra
note 22, at 3–5; De Santis et al., supra note 132. There are, however, standards in the EU that set
out criteria against which an activity will be measured in order to qualify as sustainable. See
Council Regulation 2020/852 of June 18, 2020, 2020 O.J. (L 198) 13 (EU).
286. See, e.g., Matthias J. Pickl, The Renewable Energy Strategies of Oil Majors—From Oil to
Energy, 26 ENERGY STRATEGY REVS. (2019).
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3. Institutional Independence
Lastly, engaging in climate change initiatives seems to carry a
high likelihood of compromising independence. Formally and
conventionally, the Fed has a high degree of institutional
independence. 287 “This is the idea that there are legal safeguards for
central banks as institutions that enable them to carry out their tasks
without interference or instruction from the executive branch of
government (or any other body).” 288
Institutional independence is valued for several reasons. For
monetary policymaking, freedom from political pressure is essential for
price stability. Politicians often have short-term interests in
accommodative monetary policies which please the electorate but can
damage the economy (i.e., by creating conditions for excess inflation)
over the medium and longer terms. 289 It is for this reason that former
Fed Chair Bill McChesney Martin famously remarked that the Fed’s
job is like that of a “chaperone who has ordered the punch bowl removed
just when the party was really warming up.” 290 Independence is
important for the Fed’s role in supervision and regulation as well.
Again, freedom from political pressure is key to ensuring that decisions
about the risks facing firms are made only with objective data and
technical criteria in mind.
Whether independence is threatened from Fed initiatives on
climate change would again vary depending on the posture of action(s)
taken. As noted, there are two postures that the Fed could assume. The
Fed can take a defensive position toward climate change—using
existing tools to respond to climate change if and when required. If
287. See generally TUCKER, supra note 266 (expositing theories of central bank independence).
288. See Michael Salib & Christina Parajon Skinner, Executive Override of Central Banks: A
Comparison of the Legal Frameworks in the United States and the United Kingdom, 108 GEO. L.J.
905, 911 (2020).
289. This is referred to as the “time inconsistency” problem, a theory developed by economists
Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, for which they won the Nobel Prize in 2004. See Finn
Kydland and Edward Prescott’s Contribution to Dynamic Macroeconomics: The Time Consistency
of Economic Policy and the Driving Forces Behind Business Cycles, ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. SCIS.
(Oct. 11, 2004), https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/advanced-economicsciences2004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VRL8-CYSM]. That problem generally refers to the fact that a government may
wish to keep inflation low, but expectations make this difficult. And once the public expects low
inflation, there are some political benefits to generating “bursts” of higher-than-expected growth
because they will reduce the real value of debt and increase real income and output in the shortterm.
290. William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,
Address Before the New York Group of the Investment Bankers Association of America 12 (Oct.
19, 1955), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/statements-speeches-william-mcchesney-martin-jr448/address-new-york-group-investment-bankers-association-america-7800?start_page=13
[https://perma.cc/M96B-Q5HU]; see also PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE 2–3 (2016).
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climate changes cause major macroeconomic shocks, for instance, the
Fed would deploy its crisis-fighting tools to aid the financial system. On
the financial side, if certain portfolios of loans appeared at imminent
risk of defaulting, and those exposures become much larger, then the
Fed supervisors might consider taking a position on bank soundness.
To the extent climate change does materialize in ways that become
visible to the Fed, as such, responding with its existing policy tools
would be appropriate. Indeed, intervention in those circumstances
would demonstrate an exercise of technocratic judgment that could
actually bolster Fed independence.
On the other hand, Fed independence would likely be eroded by
climate-related mission creep. 291 Fed independence tends to suffer
when it strays beyond its legal mandate at the behest of political leaders
or their constituents’ demands. 292 Accordingly, to the extent the Fed
were to stretch its mandate to pursue a greener financial system in
connection with its monetary, supervisory, or regulatory roles, such
policy actions could be costly to Fed independence, particularly if
viewed as measures adopted in reaction to political pressure. 293 The
adoption of a green QE program would exemplify such a position. But
so too would an effort to use capital charges or informal supervisory
actions to penalize or dissuade certain kinds of lending. 294
The problem with losing independence is a slippery slope—once
subjective judgments are introduced and influenced by politics or
popular pressure, there are few limits remaining on the extent to which
the Fed may one day manage, direct, or control the flow of credit.
The following table summarizes the arguable scope of the Fed’s
authority to address climate change in various of its policy areas.

291. See Skinner, supra note 146.
292. The Independence of Central Banks Is Under Threat from Politics, ECONOMIST (Apr. 13,
2019),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/04/13/the-independence-of-central-banks-isunder-threat-from-politics [https://perma.cc/UFV4-5K2D].
293. See Charles Goodhart & Rosa Lastra, Populism and Central Bank Independence, 29 OPEN
ECONOMIES REV. 49, 58 (2018) (“Attacks on central banks or central bankers exceeding their
mandate . . . are often disguised attacks on central bank independence. This can undermine their
credibility.”); How Not to Weaken Central Banks’ Independence, ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/04/13/how-not-to-weaken-central-banksindependence [https://perma.cc/F78M-GY7D] (discussing the link between populism and erosion
of central bank independence).
294. See supra Part I.B. A Fed pressed into political or popular pursuits, absent legislative
direction, could yet “become a political weapon, [risking] that America will move closer to becoming
a nation where the welfare of the ruling party trumps that of the country as a whole.” How Not to
Weaken Central Banks’ Independence, supra note 293.
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already do; but many perhaps may not. The Prudential Regulatory
Authority (“PRA”)—the Bank of England’s supervisory arm—sets out
this expectation in its supervisory statements:
2.41 The PRA expects firms to understand the financial risks from climate change and
how they will affect their business model. Firms should use scenario analysis and stress
testing to inform the risk identification process and to understand the short- and longterm financial risks to their business model from climate change. 295

Setting the expectation for firms would give Fed supervisors some basis
for discussing firms’ medium- and long-term planning, and how that
planning is ready to evolve in line with changing global circumstances.
This supervisory expectation would also give supervisors a basis
for discussing operational risk and business continuity planning vis-àvis physical risks. Concretely, the Bank Holding Company Supervision
Manual might be modified to direct examiners to consider asking:
As a matter of business continuity, how is your bank ensuring operations remain resilient
to warming over time?
How do your equity position and LTV ratios account for possible transition risks?
Lastly, how does your bank manage its business on a global scale to ensure continuity of
operation in light of the milieu of national approaches to climate risk?

Identify necessary firm data. In addition, supervisors should be
sure they have sufficient information about bank exposures. 296
Presently, supervisors rely on a variety of data from external sources,
public data providers, and ad hoc requests to institutions. 297
Supervisors may need to do further work in identifying which kinds of
information they still require from supervised institutions to better
inform their own evaluations. In fact, the Fed and Reserve Banks may
wish to engage the international central banking community at the
Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) to develop standards for managing
supervisory disclosures.
More specifically, there are fact-patterns surrounding exposures
that the microprudential supervisor should be watching. 298 Different
asset categories have some overlap when it comes to climate change. If,
295. PRUDENTIAL REGUL. AUTH., BANK ENG., SUPERVISORY STATEMENT 31/15: THE INTERNAL
CAPITAL ADEQUACY ASSESSMENT PROCESS (ICAAP) AND THE SUPERVISORY REVIEW AND
EVALUATION
PROCESS
(SREP)
13
(Apr.
2021),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/supervisory-statement/2021/ss3115-update-april2021.pdf?la=en&hash=1814D2147811DCD96C937C5DEE2674F021628A4B
[https://perma.cc/G2HY-KHKX].
296. As discussed above, the Bank Holding Company Act gives the Fed this authority. See
supra Part II.A.3.
297. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 167.
298. As of this writing, public disclosure of climate risk is not mandatory—while JPMorgan
discloses its exposure breakdown, Bank of America does not. So, market discipline cannot yet
substitute for supervision where some banks are concerned.
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for instance, storms coincided with oil price shocks, it is conceivable that
losses to real estate, insurance, and oil and gas could happen
simultaneously. Moreover, credit exposure is not the only possible
source of losses. Banking entities are also exposed to commodities—
some of which are “brown”—and derivative products that can amplify
exposure. In short, snapshots are just that—the picture of a bank’s
carbon-related exposure can always change or be partially misleading.
One wonders whether it would make good prudential sense to develop
new exposure and trade data repositories specific to carbon-heavy
assets. Ideally, to the extent the central bank is involved, its efforts
focus on institutions’ own risk management incentives. 299
Discuss model design. Relatedly, supervisors can discuss model
design with supervised banks. To the extent the impact of climate on
asset portfolios remains uncertain, banks are likely best placed to
develop models that can input data from climate scientists to
understand how balance sheets might be impacted in the medium- and
longer-terms. Those models can reveal to supervisors the likelihood—
or not—of losses that might warrant further Board attention. Either
way, that model-driven information is important.
2. Research and the Reserve Banks
In addition to supervision, the Reserve Banks—each equipped
with their own research functions—may well have a role in plugging
data gaps with research. 300 Good data and analysis is, after all, the
precondition to credible and legitimate Fed policymaking. 301
299. This sort of model would resemble one European approach that focuses more so on
supervision than regulation. The ECB approach appears to place the onus on the banks to “safely
and prudently manage climate-related and environmental risks and disclose such risks
transparently.” Press Release, Eur. Cent. Bank, ECB Launches Public Consultation on Its Guide
on
Climate-Related
and
Environmental
Risks
(May
20,
2020),
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ssm.pr200520~0795c47d73.e
n.html [https://perma.cc/BP2B-XHLM].
300. Honohan, supra note 11, at 4:
One big contribution that central banks can make is in understanding and measuring
the systemic dynamics of distribution and climate change as they interact with the
financial system. With their formidable access to data and research expertise, needed
to deliver on their primary mandate, central banks are exceptionally well placed to
improve understanding of these issues and to advise on the design and scale of potential
governmental measures in financial and macroeconomic policy most effective in
delivering societal goals along these dimensions.
301. As a former director of the Fed’s Consumer and Community Affairs division aptly noted,
“The Federal Reserve is a data-driven organization, which is a good thing. Unfortunately, data
often lag the issues. By the time an issue becomes evident in the data, it may be too late for an
effective policy response.” The Federal Reserve’s Role in Community Development—An Interview
with Sandra Braunstein, CASCADE, Winter 2014, at 3, 13, https://www.philadelphiafed.org//media/frbp/assets/community-development/articles/cascade/84/cascade_no-84.pdf
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As articulated throughout this Article, there exists considerable
uncertainty surrounding the impact of climate change on financial
assets and, in turn, price and financial stability. 302 Understanding the
shape of macroeconomic relationships vis-à-vis climate change (even as
those projections evolve alongside changes in human behavior), and
how they might impact transmission mechanisms, is a key first step in
identifying if and when climate change triggers the Fed’s responsibility
to maintain stable prices. In this vein, a firmer grasp on how asset
values stand to be impacted by climate change—or the expectation of
climate change—is also necessary to fine-tuning an assessment of the
relationship between climate change and financial stability. Developing
these kinds of novel economic models would be necessary to inform an
evolving understanding of whether any of the myriad legal authorities
discussed above might one day be triggered. 303
Still, whether the Reserve Banks can or should consider climate
change through their formal research functions is a question that
remains unsettled. On the one hand, sections 4 and 11 give Reserve
Banks and the Board, respectively, broad discretionary authority to
conduct research necessary for the “business of banking” (for Reserve
Banks) and the “business of the board” (for the Board). Moreover,
throughout the past one hundred years, the Fed effectively used these
[https://perma.cc/5ZJP-ZRFW]. The ECB has also recently taken steps in this direction by joining
the NGFS and creating a climate committee to research climate risks and their potential impact.
See Christine Lagarde, President, Eur. Cent. Bank, Keynote Speech at the ILF Conference on
Green Banking and Green Central Banking: Climate Change and Central Banking (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://www.bis.org/review/r210127d.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4CY-2QDB].
302. With that said, some central bankers are willing to trade off certainty for what they
predict to be stability gains from offensively tackling tail climate events, or “green swans.” See
THIERRY PHILIPPONNAT, BREAKING THE CLIMATE-FINANCE DOOM LOOP, FIN. WATCH (2020),
https://www.finance-watch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Breaking-the-climate-finance-doomloop_Finance-Watch-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZKS-XRNU].
303. There is a substantial economics literature on uncertainty and decisionmaking under
uncertainty, some of which intersects with central banking policy. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, Risk
and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 33 (2004). In regard to how monetary
policy should advance in the face of uncertainty, there are now two schools of thought. One, which
follows the so-called “Brainard conservatism principle,” adheres to the view that “in a dark room
you take tiny steps”—monetary policy should proceed with caution in the face of uncertainty.
William Brainard, Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 411 (1967);
Giuseppe Ferrero, Mario Pietrunti & Andre Tiseno, Monetary Policy in Times of Uncertainty: A
(Mar.
21,
2019),
Reappraisal
of
the
Brainard
Principle,
VOXEU,
https://voxeu.org/article/monetary-policy-times-uncertainty [https://perma.cc/ZK4W-755D]. Other
literature favors a more aggressive or precautionary approach. See, e.g., Giuseppe Ferrero, Mario
Pietrunti & Andre Tiseno, Benefits of Gradualism or Costs of Inaction? Monetary Policy in Times
of Uncertainty (Bank of It., Working Paper No. 1205, 2019). Recent economics literature attempts
to better understand the macroeconomic consequences of climate change and draw out
implications for policymaking. See Michael Barnett, William Brock & Lars Peter Hansen, Pricing
Uncertainty Induced by Climate Change, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 1024 (2020). From a legal perspective,
one may well be inclined to settle the debate normatively, based on assessment of how significant
a presence the central bank should play in directing the economy.
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legal authorities to develop expertise on monetary, supervisory, and
regulatory policy. 304
Yet the manner in which Reserve banks research economic
problems for which the Fed Board lacks legal authority to confront is a
grey—and thorny—issue. There could be political and reputational
costs to the system involved, 305 insofar as research agendas send signals
to, nudge, and exert moral suasion on banks and markets contrary to
administrative law principles holding that regulation should not
happen through these kinds of back doors. How this tension should be
resolved is an open question that motivates future research. 306
CONCLUSION
There are legal limits to what policy actions central banks can
take, and the Fed is no exception. In a society based on the rule of law,
the Fed is bound to stay within the lanes of its statutory mandates—to
maintain a stable economy and financial system, and to avert unsafe
practices among the banks it oversees. While climate change may be a
significant economic problem or concern, the Fed’s present authority in
this space remains limited. Just as other areas of tremendous economic
importance—trade and immigration, just to name a few—sit outside
the Fed’s arena, so, too, with climate change. As American economist
Lloyd Mints wrote in a famed 1950 work: “[M]onetary action is not
appropriate as a remedial measure for the economic ills of specific
areas, industries, or groups of consumers or producers.” 307 Society may
well wish to look to government for wide-ranging solutions to climate
change, but not necessarily to the Fed.

304. Carola C. Binder & Christina Parajon Skinner, Laboratories of Central Banking (2021)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (studying the research function of the Reserve
banks from a legal history and contemporary empirical standpoint).
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See LLOYD MINTS, MONETARY POLICY FOR A COMPETITIVE SOCIETY 117–18 (1950).

